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Abstract
We illustrate a new source of comparative advantage that is generated by
countries’ different ability to adjust to technological change. Our model in-
troduces substitution of workers in codifiable (routine) tasks with more ef-
ficient machines, a process extensively documented in the labor literature,
into a canonical 2 × 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model. Our key hypothesis is
that labor reallocation across tasks is subject to frictions, the importance of
which varies by country. The arrival of capital-augmenting innovations trig-
gers the movement of workers out of routine tasks, and countries with low
labor market frictions become relatively abundant in non-routine labor. In
the new equilibrium, more flexible countries specialize in producing goods
that use non-routine labor more intensively. We document empirically that
the ranking of countries with respect to the routine intensity of their exports
is strongly related to labor market institutions and to cultural norms that
influence adjustment to technological change, such as risk aversion or long-
term orientation. The explanatory power of this mechanism for trade flows is
especially strong for intra-EU trade.
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1 Introduction
The labor literature has highlighted that workers perform tasks differingmarkedly in
codifiability or routineness (Autor et al., 2003). Capital and computers are stronger
substitutes for the labor input in routine tasks than in abstract tasks. Yet, technol-
ogy adoption is not a frictionless process (Bresnahan et al., 2002). As the economy
becomes more capital intensive with the arrival of labor-saving technologies, workers
continuously need to transition from more routine to more abstract tasks (Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018). We will show that an ability to facilitate such transitions gives
countries a comparative advantage in industries that are intensive in non-routine
tasks.
The classic theory of comparative advantage illustrates how differences in tech-
nology or factor endowments lead countries to specialize in the production of dif-
ferent goods. Recent developments in this literature highlight that differences in
worker attributes and institutions can also influence specialization. Trade special-
ization has, among other factors, been linked to skill dispersion (Bombardini et al.,
2012), attitudes towards obedience (Campante and Chor, 2017), labor market flex-
ibility (Cun˜at and Melitz, 2012), and the strength of contract enforcement (Nunn,
2007). Chor (2010) finds that institutional differences matter as much as traditional
factor endowments of human and physical capital in determining trade patterns.
Our contribution is to relate an important feature of the production process
that is highlighted in the labor literature, to trade theory. We start from a well-
documented pattern associated with the process of technological change.1 The con-
tinuous introduction of more efficient machines displaces workers in relatively more
codifiable (routine) tasks where new machines are relatively more productive. Such
automation frees up labor to perform less codifiable (non-routine) tasks. In princi-
ple, labor is infinitely substitutable with the new machines in routine tasks (Autor
et al., 2003). Yet, most studies assume that substitution is finite, which we inter-
pret as indicating the presence of adjustment costs. The equilibrium allocation of
labor to routine and non-routine tasks depends on the magnitude of these costs. We
show that cross-country variation in the ability to adjust to new technologies and to
reallocate workers between tasks induces specialization, and thus becomes a novel
source of comparative advantage.
Several studies already illustrate that flexible labor market institutions facilitate
the speed and extent of adjustment to trade liberalization (Kambourov, 2009; Dix-
1See in particular Autor et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Goos et al. (2014), Harrigan
et al. (2016) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018).
2
Carneiro, 2014). Gains from trade are higher when workers can move more easily
from import-competing to comparative advantage sectors. In our case, it is the
adjustment flexibility itself—taken in the broad sense of all features that facilitate
technology adoption and labor reallocation—that creates comparative advantage.
To illustrate this mechanism we incorporate task routineness into an otherwise
canonical 2-country 2-good 2-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model. The final goods are
produced with two factors: one routine and one non-routine. The available quanti-
ties of these factors are not given exogenously, but are determined by the equilibrium
allocation of labor to routine and non-routine tasks. The flexibility of labor realloca-
tion matters in this economy because we implicitly assume that there is an ongoing
process of technological change which we model as an increase in the capital endow-
ment.2 As in Autor et al. (2003) and Autor and Dorn (2013), capital can only be
used in routine tasks. As more capital becomes available, its relative price falls and
the equilibrium capital intensity in routine input production rises. Consequently,
labor can be released from routine tasks and reallocated to non-routine tasks.3
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) provide an explicit dynamicmodel where the con-
tinuous introduction of new capital or labor-saving technologies creates a permanent
need for adjustment. We opt for a static model—taking the process of capital deep-
ening to be exogenous and common across countries—to focus on the incidence of
differences in adjustment costs on the extent of labor reallocation. Indeed, the novel
ingredient in our model is that the reallocation of workers between tasks is subject
to frictions, the importance of which varies by country.4
We model this variation as a country-specific elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor in routine production. This assumption can be considered as
a reduced form way of capturing differences in labor market regulations, worker
bargaining power, or other factors that make it less likely for workers to switch
employer. We include a stylized model to micro-found the assumption of a country-
specific elasticity of substitution parameter. Countries share the same production
2The same results might also be obtained by modeling technological change as an increase in the
capital productivity coefficient, but the normalization of the CES production function (discussed
below) greatly complicates that approach.
3In Autor and Dorn (2013), workers performing routine tasks in manufacturing can only be
reallocated to manual (non-routine) tasks in services. We follow the approach in Autor et al.
(2003), where reallocation is possible between routine and non-routine tasks in manufacturing, but
relax their assumption of perfect capital-labor substitutability in routine tasks.
4The magnitude of adjustment costs influences the propensity to invest in and adopt new
technologies (Bartelsman et al., 2016). We expect this channel—missing in our static set-up—to
reinforce our results as the country with low adjustment costs would invest relatively more and
reallocate evenmore labor to non-routine tasks if the process of capital deepening were endogenized.
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technology, but they differ in the real costs that are incurred when workers change
jobs. Although we introduce the friction on the ‘outgoing’ labor side, we could also
have introduced it on the ‘incoming’ capital side to capture cultural or institutional
differences—such as behavioral norms in the workplace—that affect the costs of
technology adoption. Specifically, we expect the elasticity of substitution to be
decreasing in the magnitude of hiring, firing, as well as organizational and retraining
costs associated with the adjustment of the workforce to the new machinery.5
The model predicts that countries which adjust more smoothly to technological
change—i.e., countries with a higher elasticity of substitution—free up more labor
from routine tasks and become non-routine labor abundant. As in the canonical
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the abundance of non-routine labor leads them to special-
ize in goods that are non-routine labor intensive. As a result, the arrival of more
capital or capital-biased technological change that triggers the process of labor real-
location, will endogenously differentiate countries. This new source of comparative
advantage helps explain why countries with similar capital-labor endowments and
technology specialize in different goods. Moreover, the welfare effects of trade also
differ. While capital deepening increases the real wage in both countries, trade
strengthens this effect for the high-σ country that specializes in non-routine produc-
tion, but diminishes the beneficial effect for workers in the low-σ country.
We test the predictions on trade specialization using three annual cross-sections
(1995, 2005, 2015) for two country samples: one for the 50 largest exporters in the
world and a second for the 28 EUmember states. Following the two-step approach of
Costinot (2009), we show in a first step that the export bundles of different countries
are rather distinct in terms of their relative routine intensity.
In a second step, we investigate whether the country-level routine specialization
is related to institutional or cultural characteristics that are plausibly correlated with
the ease of labor reallocation across tasks. The results indicate that the OECD’s
indicator for ‘strictness of employment protection legislation’ is a strong predictor on
the EU sample. Countries with relatively strict regulations specialize in goods that
are more routine intensive. In the more diverse sample of large global exporters,
the following three variables predict routine specialization: (low) ‘quality of the
workforce’ (Costinot, 2009) and two cultural features, risk aversion and long-term
orientation (Hofstede, 1980).
We evaluate the predictive power of our mechanism by relating bilateral exports
5Preference heterogeneity, e.g. risk aversion or long-term orientation, would affect the propen-
sity to invest in new technologies and could also lead to differences in perceived capital-labor
substitutability.
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at the industry level to an interaction between sectoral routine intensity and the
relevant country endowments. We find the expected positive sign everywhere, but
our mechanism is particularly informative in predicting trade patterns between EU
member states. They tend to have similar factor endowments and level of technology
and the more traditional sources of comparative advantage have only low predictive
power. Importantly, while the extent of (non-)routine specialization across countries
declines somewhat over time when using gross exports as the dependent variable, the
effect remains strong if we use value added trade and thus account for the increased
international fragmentation of production.
Our analysis contributes to the trade literature that seeks to uncover new mech-
anisms behind the pattern of specialization: Nunn and Trefler (2014) survey the
theoretic and empirical literatures that consider domestic institutions as a source of
comparative advantage, and we already mentioned the most relevant mechanisms.
Labor market flexibility in particular has been shown by Cun˜at and Melitz (2012)
to induce specialization by conferring a comparative advantage in sectors where
idiosyncratic shocks lead to high sales volatility. Our mechanism derives from the
benefit that labor market flexibility confers in adjusting to pervasive capital-biased
technological change. As capital deepening changes the equilibrium allocation of
labor across tasks, a country’s measured factor abundance, e.g. the ratio of skilled
to unskilled labor, may itself be influenced by the interaction of institutions with
the process of technological change.
Our analysis also speaks to the trade literature that links labor market flexibility
to the magnitude of the gains from trade. Lower adjustment costs help countries
reap the gains from trade liberalization (Dix-Carneiro, 2014). A novel implication
of our model is that workers in the country with high capital-labor substitutability
benefit relatively more from capital deepening in the open economy setting.
Our work is closely related to the rapidly growing literature in labor economics
that documents how increased automation and outsourcing of codifiable tasks led to
job polarization in developed economies. This literature explicitly links technological
change to labor displacement from routine to non-routine tasks (Autor et al., 2003;
Autor and Dorn, 2013; Ba´ra´ny and Siegel, 2018). Our work also builds on the
insights from the growth literature that connects capital-labor substitutability to
capital accumulation (Klump and de la Grandville, 2000). Stokey (1996) shows in a
model with capital-skill complementarity that the incentive to accumulate capital is
increasing in the substitutability of capital with unskilled labor. Bartelsman et al.
(2016) document how labor markets flexibility determines the gains from capital
deepening by increasing the expected gain from investment in disruptive technology.
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Our work explicitly connects the magnitude of adjustment costs to the perceived
capital-labor substitutability. By embedding this mechanism in a Heckscher-Ohlin
model, we pin down the impact of labor market flexibility on the magnitude of
workers’ gains from trade in the context of capital deepening.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
the main features of the stylized model and provide a possible micro-foundation
for country differences in capital-labor substitutability. Next we derive the autarky
equilibrium and the predictions regarding trade patterns. Section 3 describes the
data and Section 4 the empirical model. Section 5 contains the estimation results
that link trade patterns, in terms of (non-)routine specialization, to country char-
acteristics. In Section 6 we draw some conclusions from the analysis.
2 The model
Our objective is to analyze in the simplest possible way the trade implications of
differences in the ease of factor reallocation. We introduce this through heterogene-
ity of the substitution parameter σ in a production function that has been used
extensively in the labor literature (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). It is intended to
capture a variety of adjustment frictions, e.g. firing costs, risk aversion, etc. in a re-
duced form way. Before solving the model, we provide a simple way to micro-found
differences in σ.
The model is structured as the canonical 2× 2× 2 Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model
where the pattern of trade is determined by the interaction of country-specific factor
endowments and sector-specific factor intensities. Its distinguishing feature is that
the endowments of the relevant production factors for the production of the two
final goods, namely non-routine tasks and a routine intermediate, are endogenously
determined (‘produced’) by the optimal allocation of labor to either task.6 Two
countries with identical endowments of ‘primitive’ factors, capital and labor, can
have an incentive to trade, simply because they differ in the substitutability of
capital and labor in the production of the routine tasks. A country with a higher
elasticity of substitution parameter σ will be able to move labor more easily out of
routine tasks when capital becomes abundant. It will specialize in the final good
industry that uses the scarce, non-routine factor more intensely.
The comparative statics analysis considers how countries with different σ param-
eters adjust differentially to an exogenous increase in the capital stock that triggers
6All capital is dedicated to the production of the routine intermediate input.
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capital-labor substitution and the reallocation of labor. To study this in a static
model, we measure the change from an initial point of production where the equilib-
rium allocation is identical in the two countries. We will discuss that this requires
a normalization of the CES function to make the same production plan attainable
without requiring the other parameters than σ to be country specific.
In the following sub-sections we derive the trade implications in six steps: (1)
the 2 × 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin set-up, (2) a micro-foundation for σ differences in
the production function, (3) solving for the equilibrium allocations and production,
(4) normalizing the CES-component in the production function, (5) the pattern of
specialization, and (6) implications of opening up to trade.
2.1 Set-up
Denote two countries by i ∈ {A,B}; they have identical factor endowments of capital
K¯ and labor L¯. Denote two final goods by g ∈ {1, 2}; they are produced with two
factors, non-routine (abstract) labor La and a routine intermediate input M which
is itself produced from capital K and routine labor Lm. The resource constraint
on labor is La + Lm ≤ L¯. Note that assuming one type of labor to be perfectly
mobile between abstract and routine work is a simplification that works against the
mechanism we intend to illustrate.
As is common in the canonical HO model, the production function for final goods
is Cobb-Douglas:
Yig = zg (L
a
ig)
1−βg (Mig)βg , (1)
where zg is a productivity parameter and βg the factor share of the routine input.
Both parameters are common across countries. Let good 1 be non-routine intensive:
i.e., β1 < β2.
Also standard is that consumers in both countries have identical, homothetic
demand over the two final goods. For simplicity, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas utility
function: Ui =
∑
g θg ln(Qig). Consumers maximize utility subject to the budget
constraint
∑
g PigQig ≤ riK¯ + wiL¯, where wi is the wage and ri the rental rate of
capital. It leads to constant budget shares for both final goods.
Given the focus on capital-labor substitutability in routine production, we simply
assume that each unit of raw labor can directly produce either routine or abstract
tasks and that this choice is reversible. In particular, one unit of routine labor can
seamlessly be converted into one unit of abstract labor. We explicitly choose not to
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focus solely on the difficulty for routine workers to acquire the necessary skills to
perform abstract tasks. We are interested in any type of reallocation friction that
makes capital-labor substitution less than infinite, such that a labor-saving machine
cannot instantaneously replace all workers in routine production.7
We adopt a CES production function for the production of the routine interme-
diate:
Mi = Z
[
α(Ki)
σi−1
σi + (1− α)(Lmi )
σi−1
σi
] σi
σi−1
, (2)
where Z and α are the efficiency and distribution parameters, and σi captures the
ease of input substitutability.8 We follow Autor et al. (2003) and Autor and Dorn
(2013) and assume that capital and routine labor are more substitutable in routine
production than is the case between non-routine labor and the routine input in
the production of final goods, formally that σi > 1 (where one is the elasticity of
substitution of the outer Cobb-Douglas). Let country A have relatively high input
substitution in routine production such that σA > σB > 1.
In this set-up, country A will be non-routine labor abundant in autarky and
will produce relatively more output in sector 1, which uses non-routine labor more
intensively. Given identical, homothetic preferences, good 1 will be relatively cheap,
giving country A a comparative advantage in it. The key element in our model is
that the quantities of abstract labor and the routine intermediate are endogenously
determined, depending on the optimal allocation of labor to routine and non-routine
tasks.
Plugging (2) into (1), we obtain the following two-tiered production function:
Yig = zg (L
a
ig)
1−βg
{
Z
[
α(Kig)
σi−1
σi + (1− α)(Lmig)
σi−1
σi
] σi
σi−1
}βg
. (3)
In Appendix A we discuss estimates of a nested production function of the form
of (3). The analysis uses the KLEMS dataset that has country-sector-year obser-
vations and measures abstract and routine labor input by the number of high or
low-skilled employees, which is not ideal, but can serve as an approximation. To
7Redeploying routine labor to abstract tasks could require a human capital investment, but we
do not model this explicitly, as it would lead to task-specific wages. The σ parameter is a reduced
form way of representing various frictions associated with labor reallocation across tasks.
8Note that the Z and α parameters are assumed common across countries. For two countries
with the same endowments but different σi parameters to be able to produce the same output
bundle, requires a normalization, see for example Klump et al. (2012). We discuss this in greater
detail in Section 2.4.
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evaluate the appropriateness of our assumptions, we initially allow for country-sector
specific β and σ parameters, exploiting only time variation in the estimation. An
ANOVA analysis indicates that country dummies have the most explanatory power
for the elasticity of substitution estimates σˆ, while sector dummies have more ex-
planatory power for the output elasticity of the routine intermediate estimates βˆ. It
suggests that our assumptions on the country respectively sector-specificity of these
two parameters is broadly consistent with the observed variation between outputs
and inputs in the KLEMS data.
2.2 Micro-foundation for differences in σ
The elasticity of substitution parameter σ in a CES production function is generally
considered to be a representation of technology. Here we show that countries with
the same production technology, but with different (labormarket) institutions adjust
their input choices to a different extent when hit by the same exogenous shock. It
illustrates how a labor market friction can give rise to variation in the elasticity of
substitution, i.e., how easy it is in practice to substitute between capital and labor.
We consider a lay-off cost to be paid by any firm that seeks to reduce its work-
force, for example in response to an increase in the relative price of labor. Given
that ours is a real trade model, the lay-off cost has to be paid directly in terms of
output of the firm. It means that
y + pC(L) y = F (K,L), (4)
where p is a country-specific cost shifter that we use in the comparative statics to
vary the importance of this friction. C(L) is the lay-off cost that satisfies C(L¯) = 0,
C ′(L) < 0, and C ′′(L) > 0 for any L < L¯.9 In words, the cost kicks in when the firm
reduces labor input below its initial level L¯, the marginal cost is positive for lay-offs
(negative changes in L), and the cost is convex, i.e. the marginal cost increases in
the amount of workers the firms seeks to shed, which is a standard assumption.10
Combining technology and institutions leads to the following modified production
function:
y =
F (K,L)
1 + pC(L)
. (5)
9In the analysis of comparative advantage, we consider an increase in the capital stock which
tends to increase the relative wage. Hence, the relative adjustment involves reducing labor input.
10Small employment reductions can often be accommodated relatively easily by not replacing
retiring workers or by natural job attrition, and thus incur smaller than proportional costs.
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We view the real lay-off cost in (4) as representative for a variety of institutional
differences between countries that can be modelled in a reduced form way by a het-
erogeneous elasticity of substitution parameter. In addition to a lay-off cost per se,
the cost parameter can be interpreted in alternative ways. It can stand, for exam-
ple, for a legal obligation by the former employer to provide retraining to workers
who are dismissed. Cross-country differences in the fraction of such costs borne by
individual firms, and not by a public system, have similar effects as a variation in
severance pay. Another interpretation is as equilibrium compensation to workers
for the risk involved in job transitions.11 Due to mobility barriers between regions
and sectors or due to transitory unemployment spells, many dismissed workers will
experience a period of lower earnings with variation across countries in its duration
and the amount of income lost. Going beyond differences in transition costs, the
equilibrium compensation accompanying dismissals can also vary if workers differ in
their risk aversion. They will regard the risk of not finding an equally well paid job in
the non-routine sector differently, and hence their certainty equivalent of switching
to the other sector will differ. We therefore regard the set-up in (4) as representing
a wider class of models where adjustments in total labor input to exogenous shocks
involve real costs.
Similarly, institutional or cultural differences can also introduce costs associated
with adjustments in the capital stock, e.g. as firms invest in new technology. Aug-
menting the capital stock might increase its productivity with a probability close
to, but short of one. If decision-makers differ across countries in their risk aversion,
or in the extent to which they take a long-term perspective in investment decisions,
the benefit of increasing the capital stock will be assessed differently. If the new
production plan involves a change in the capital stock, such a mechanism would
also give rise to a modified, country-specific production function, of a form similar
to (5):
y =
F (K,L)
1− p˜ C˜(K) ,
We now show the effect of a difference in the lay-off cost friction p on the elasticity
of substitution for the modified production function (5). The latter is defined as
σL,K =
d(L/K)
dMRTS
MRTS
L/K
.
11Bewley (2009) provides evidence that compensation for dismissals in the United States tends
to be much higher than legally required. Many managers discuss existing practices as equilibrium
compensation for job transition costs that dismissed employees are likely to incur.
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We derive in Appendix B for the special case of perfect substitution between inputs
in the underlying production function, i.e., for F (K,L) = K + L, that σL,K for the
modified production function is finite if pC ′′ > 0. Moreover, the derivative of σL,K
with respect to the cost shifter p equals
∂σL,K
∂p
=
−pC ′(L)y − 1
L
+
−pC ′(L)y − 1 + 2(pC ′(L)y)2
K
. (6)
The first term is negative as long as −pC ′(L)y < 1, or the marginal friction does not
exceed the marginal product of labor, which must be satisfied for the adjustment
to be optimal. The second term is a polynomial of order two which is negative
for −pC ′(L)y ∈ (−1, 1/2); that is, the marginal friction does not exceed half the
marginal product of labor. Since the terms are weighted by 1/L and 1/K respec-
tively, this constraint is relaxed at higher K and lower L. As long as the friction is
not excessive, we thus find a negative effect of the cost shifter p—which measures
the importance of the friction—on the elasticity of substitution. In other words, a
more severe friction reduces the optimal (from the firm’s perspective) substitution
of capital for labor.
The above mechanism links labor market frictions in the form of a convex lay-
off cost to lower substitutability of capital and labor. Several recent papers have
documented large and highly heterogeneous adjustment costs when workers switch
occupations. Dix-Carneiro (2014) finds for the median Brazilian worker switching
jobs a cost ranging from 1.4 to 2.7 times the average annual wage.12 Autor et al.
(2014) even find that adjustment costs may be prohibitively high for less skilled and
older workers and shocks can lead to a permanent exit from the labor force.13
While adjustment cost are likely to vary in importance across workers, we will
focus on institutional characteristics that determine a country-specific component in
the adjustment cost. Several papers have suggested thatmore stringent labormarket
regulation reduces the speed of adjustment of an economy to structural change. For
example, Wasmer (2006) shows that countries withmore rigid labormarkets perform
better in the steady state as workers are more productive, but following structural
shocks they experience a longer and more costly transition period. Comparing the
adjustment to trade liberalization in Mexico and Chile, Kambourov (2009) shows
that high firing costs in Mexico slowed down the process of worker reallocation
to comparative advantage activities. Artuc¸ et al. (2015) estimate the magnitude
12Artuc¸ et al. (2010) report even higher costs for the median U.S. worker, but they have less
detailed controls for worker characteristics.
13Pierce and Schott (2016) report that one third of workers who lost employment in U.S. man-
ufacturing as a consequence of import competition from China transition to inactivity.
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of switching costs for workers and document that countries with relatively high
switching costs also adjust more slowly to trade shocks.
2.3 Solving the model
After providing a motivation for the production function, we solve the model by
finding the relative supply and demand of the two ‘produced’ factors, the routine
intermediate and abstract labor. The solution to the model delivers the optimal
allocation of labor to routine and non-routine tasks. We show here the main steps
to solve the model and provide further details in Appendix C.
On the supply side, we have three types of price-taking firms, producing the
routine intermediate input and both final goods. The cost and thus the optimal
input combinations must be the same for routine inputs used in either final goods
sector. Cost minimization of the CES production function in (2) gives conditional
factor demands for capital and routine labor. Substituting them in the production
function and then in the objective function gives the unit cost of the routine input
in terms of factor prices. Given the assumption of perfect competition, this also
equals the price of the routine input:
Pmi = C(wi, ri) =
1
Z
[
ασir1−σii + (1− α)σi w1−σii
] 1
1−σi . (7)
Cost minimization of the Cobb-Douglas production function in (1) leads to a
straightforward expression of unit costs of the final goods, and thus prices Pig, again
as a function of the relevant factor prices, i.e., the price of the routine input and the
wage rate:
Pig = Cig(wi, Pmi ) =
1
zg
(
wi
1− βg
)1−βg (Pmi
βg
)βg
, ∀g ∈ {1, 2}. (8)
By combining (7) and (8), we can express the final goods prices in terms of wi and
ri, see equation (C5) in the Appendix. Hence, we can express the price ratio Pi1/Pi2
in terms of the ‘primitive’ factor price ratio wi/ri, as in the canonical HO model.
Next, note that capital can only be used in routine production. The capital
demand in routine production, i.e., the first-order condition for K, provides an
expression for the optimal quantity of the routine intermediate as a function of the
capital endowment and the relative factor price ratio. The production function of
the routine intermediate then determines how much labor to allocate to routine
tasks.
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Labor market clearing then gives the total quantity of abstract labor as a func-
tion of the labor endowment and factor prices: Lai = L¯ − Lmi (wi/ri; K¯). Optimal
factor use in routine production together with market clearing for labor and capital
determines the relative supply of the two produced factors, which is the relevant
factor ratio available to the two final goods sectors taken together. The ratio of
produced factors can then be expressed as a function of primitive endowments and
the prices of the primitive factors as follows:
Lai
Mi
=
L¯
K¯
−
[
wi/(1−αi)
ri/αi
]−σi
Zα
σi
σi−1
i
{
1 + wi
ri
[
wi/(1−αi)
ri/αi
]−σi} σiσi−1 (9)
We now turn to the demand side of the economy to derive an expression for
the relative demand for produced factors. We have assumed a Cobb-Douglas utility
function that implies constant budget shares. Substituting the expressions for final
goods prices (8), we find an expression for relative final good consumption as a
function of the produced factor prices:
Qi1
Qi2
=
θ1z1β
β1
1 (1− β1)1−β1
θ2z2β
β2
2 (1− β2)1−β2
(
wi
Pmi
)β1−β2
(10)
Using the production function andmarket clearing for final goods, we can express
the output ratio in (10) in terms of the allocation of the produced factors to both
sectors:
Qi1
Qi2
=
Yi1
Yi2
=
z1L
a
i1
1−β1Mi1β1
z2Lai2
1−β2Mi2β2
. (11)
Plugging in the first order conditions of the final good producers and of the con-
sumers, we find that the allocation of production factors to both sectors depends
only on the preference and technology parameters.14 As a result, the relative factor
demand takes the following simple form:
Lai
Mi
=
∑
g θg(1− βg)∑
g θgβg
Pmi
wi
(12)
This is the familiar HO equation that connects relative factor abundance to relative
14The simple form of these expressions is a result of the Cobb-Douglas functional form for both
preferences and the production function that leads to constant expenditure shares for consumers
and constant cost shares for producers.
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factor prices in final good production. The only difference in our model is in terms of
interpretation, namely, the production factors in this equation are produced rather
than exogenously given.
We combine the relative factor supply equation (9) with the relative factor de-
mand equation (12) to pin down the equilibrium factor price ratio. Because the
second relationship is expressed in terms of produced factor prices, we still need to
use (7) to eliminate PMi . Equating the two expressions, we get an implicit solution
for the equilibrium factor price ratio ω∗ = (wi/ri)∗ as a function of parameters and
of ‘primitive’ factor endowments. We can write this expression as
Fi (ω
∗
i ) =
c
ω∗i
+ (1 + c)
(
α
1− α ω
∗
i
)−σi
− L¯
K¯
= 0, (13)
where c = (
∑
g θg(1− βg))/(
∑
g θgβg) summarizes information on factor use in final
good production and consumers’ preferences over final goods.
It is straightforward to establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
real wage. The function Fi(ωi) attains a positive value for the lowest value in
the domain, limωi→0 Fi (ωi) = +∞, and a negative value for the highest value,
limωi→∞ Fi (ωi) = −L¯/K¯. As the function is continuous, it must equal zero for at
least one positive, but finite value of ωi.
Moreover, the function is monotonically decreasing in ωi as the derivative
∂F (ωi)
∂ωi
= −c ω−2i − σi(1 + c)
(
α
1− α
)1−σi
ω−σi−1i < 0 (14)
is negative for all positive real wage rates, which guarantees that the solution is
unique. This is useful for the comparative statics that follow, as we do not need to
worry about factor intensity reversals.
2.4 Normalizing the CES function
Before we can derive comparative statics of how the σ parameter influences the
equilibrium allocation and international trade, it is necessary to normalize the CES
function (2). This is because a high σ has two different effects. First, it facilitates
producing with a more unequal K/Lm input ratio. With a higher σ parameter,
the marginal product of a production factor declines more slowly if the amount of
that factor increases. The second effect of a higher σ parameter is to make routine
production more efficient overall. The output of intermediate M is increasing in σ
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for any given bundle of production factors.
Our objective is to study how countries that start from the same initial situation
can develop a comparative advantage as they adjust to the same external shock, for
example in response to an increase in the capital stock. The substitution effect is
the one of interest, as it directly influences how much labor will be reallocated from
routine to non-routine tasks. The second, efficiency effect is more of a nuisance, as
it makes it more complicated to determine whether two countries with different σ
parameters are initially able to produce the same output bundle.
Klump et al. (2012) have shown that normalizing the CES production function
makes it possible to focus on the structural effect of higher substitutability.15 The
rationale behind the normalization follows from the defining property of a CES
production function, namely that σ = d ln(K/L)/d ln(Fk/Fl) is constant. The elas-
ticity of substitution is defined as a point elasticity, valid for a particular point
on a particular isoquant. It is fundamentally a second-order differential equation
of F (K,L). Solving this equation to find F introduces two integration constants.
Both are fixed once the following two boundary conditions are imposed on the result-
ing CES production function: (1) It must be able to produce an initial production
plan, a combination of output and inputs; (2) The initial allocation must be cost
minimizing, i.e., the isoquant is tangent to the initial relative factor price ratio.
If a CES isoquant has to go through one particular point, its integration constants
will depend on σ and cannot be chosen freely. The elasticity of substitution σi is
the only structural parameter for country i; together with the boundary conditions
it determines the other two parameters, Zi = Z(σi) and αi = α(σi).
To implement the normalization, we reformulate two key relationships that we
derived earlier in terms of deviations from an initial production plan. That way, we
can investigate how countries with a different σ adjust differentially to an external
shock, starting from the same point of normalization. Denote the optimal factor
allocation in routine input production by κ∗i = K¯/(L
m
i )
∗ and indicate quantities
and prices at the point of normalization with a subscript 0. The normalized first
order condition in routine production, equation (C1) in the Appendix, then becomes
κ∗i
κ0
=
(
ω∗i
ω0
)σi
. (15)
Equation (15) illustrates the key property of a CES production function: the
15de la Grandville (1989) shows that the substitution effect can always be written as a σ-multiple
of the efficiency effect.
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sensitivity of relative factor use to a change in relative factor prices is increasing
in σi. If labor becomes more expensive than at the point of normalization, routine
production will become more capital intensive and this change will be especially
strong in the high-σ country. Or inversely, a given change in the capital-labor ratio
will lead to a smaller change in the relative factor price ratio in the high-σ country.
Substituting (15) back in the original first order condition, we find that α varies
with σi and equals α(σi) =
κ
1/σi
0
κ
1/σi
0 +ω0
. From the routine production function at
the point of normalization, we can solve for the productivity term Zi as Z(σi) =
M0
Lm0
(
κ
1/σi
0 +ω0
κ0+ω0
)σi−1
σi
. As mentioned, a country-specific σi parameter will in general
require country-specific Zi and αi parameters in order to make the same initial
production plan feasible. Using this expression for αi, the function F (·) in (13)
becomes
Fi
(
ω∗i ; σi,
L¯
K¯
, c, κ0
)
=
c
ω∗i
+
1 + c
κ0
[
ω∗i
ω0
]−σi
− L¯
K¯
= 0. (16)
As we imposed the same Z and α coefficients in the intermediate goods produc-
tion function (2) for all countries, it will not generally be possible for all countries
with different σi parameters to produce the same output bundle from the same
K¯/L¯ endowments. There is, however, one endowment ratio for which the same pro-
duction plan is always feasible. It is straightforward to see from (13) or (16) that
the same equilibrium factor price will obtain if ω0 α/(1 − α) = 1 or equivalently
if w0/(1 − α) = r0/α, irrespective of the σi parameter. In that case, cost mini-
mization in routine production also implies that κ0 ≡ K¯0/Lm0 = 1. It makes the
choice of how much labor to allocate to routine tasks independent of the elasticity
of substitution.16
We can now show how the relative wage ω∗i changes when factor endowments
deviate from the point of normalization. Consider a change in the stock of capital
K¯ ≷ K¯0, holding the labor endowment fixed at L¯ = L¯0. We apply the implicit
function theorem to Fi(·) in (16) and find that17
∂ω∗i
∂K
= − ∂Fi(·)/∂K
∂Fi(·)/∂ω∗i
> 0. (17)
16In that point of normalization, αi = 1/(1 + ω0) and Zi = M0/L
m
0 , and both do not vary with
σi.
17The derivative in the numerator is positive for our production function. The derivative in the
denominator is negative for all wage rates, see equation (14).
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The relative wage unambiguously rises above its value at the point of normalization
whenever the stock of capital exceeds its initial level:
K¯  K¯0 ⇒ ω
∗
i
ω0
 1. (18)
The direction of change does not depend on σi, but the extent of the change will. The
differential adjustment in the two countries will determine the relative abundance of
the produced factors and the relative price of final goods. We next determine how
this new equilibrium allocation depends on σi as both countries adjust away from
the point of normalization.
2.5 Pattern of specialization
We want to find out how σ influences the relative specialization of two economies.
Recall that we defined a point of normalization where both countries produce the
same equilibrium production plan. The question is how their allocations will differ
when they move away from this point in response to an increase in the capital stock.
We apply the implicit function theorem to (16) one more time and find
∂ω∗i
∂σ
= − ∂Fi(·)/∂σ
∂Fi(·)/∂ω∗i
.
We already established that the denominator is negative. Hence, the sign of this
expression is determined by the sign of the numerator,
∂Fi(·)
∂σ
= − ln
(
ω∗i
ω0
)
(1 + c)
κ0
[
ω∗i
ω0
]−σ
,
which depends on the equilibrium relative wage relative to the relative wage at the
point of normalization.
It follows that when the price of labor increases relatively to the point of nor-
malization, which will happen following an increase in the capital stock, labor will
be relatively cheap in the high-σ country in the new equilibrium. Hence,
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∂ω∗i
∂σ
< 0 ⇔ K¯ > K0 or ω∗i > ω0
∂ω∗i
∂σ
= 0 ⇔ K¯ = K0 or ω∗i = ω0
∂ω∗i
∂σ
> 0 ⇔ K¯ < K0 or ω∗i < ω0.
(19)
A higher σ dampens the effect of a change in factor endowments on the equilibrium
relative wage. The relative wage increases, but it increases relatively less in the
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high-σ country A: ω0 < ω
∗
A < ω
∗
B.
Recall from (12) that it is sufficient to establish in which country the relative
price of the routine intermediate is relatively high in autarky to determine relative
abundance of ‘produced’ factors. It is intuitive and straightforward to show that
d(Pmi /wi)/dωi < 0.
18 In combination with the results in (19), it implies that the
relative price of the routine input is increasing in σ for all capital stocks that exceed
the level at the point of normalization and vice versa:
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
d(Pmi /wi)
∗
dω∗i
∂ω∗i
∂σ
> 0 & d(L
a/M)
dσ
> 0 ⇔ K¯ > K0
d(Pmi /wi)
∗
dω∗i
∂ω∗i
∂σ
= 0 & d(L
a/M)
dσ
= 0 ⇔ K¯ = K0
d(Pmi /wi)
∗
dω∗i
∂ω∗i
∂σ
< 0 & d(L
a/M)
dσ
< 0 ⇔ K¯ < K0
(20)
The intuition is as follows. When labor becomes more scarce than in the nor-
malization point, it will be expensive and the routine input relatively cheap. The
price changes are needed to clear both factor markets after a capital injection, but
they are especially pronounced in the low-σ country. It makes labor relatively more
expensive in the low-σ country and the routine intermediate expensive in the high-
σ country. It follows that after capital deepening, the high-σ country A becomes
relatively abundant in non-routine labor: (La/M)∗A > (L
a/M)∗B. More flexible sub-
stitution between capital and labor helps the economy to use more efficiently the
‘primitive’ production factor that has become more scarce (labor), where scarcity is
defined relative to the point of normalization.
As countries accumulate capital, which we interpret as a reduced-form represen-
tation of capital-biased technological change, they reallocate labor from routine to
non-routine tasks.19 A high-σ country frees up more labor for non-routine tasks and
becomes non-routine labor abundant. This holds even though the high-σ country
is relatively efficient in routine production, i.e. for the same input bundle it can
produce more output in routine production.20 As the substitution effect dominates
the efficiency effect, a country with higher σ will specialize, at least relatively, in
non-routine intensive goods. In the new equilibrium, capital intensity in routine
18From equation (7) we can derive
d(Pmi /wi)
∗
dω∗i
=
−α σσ−1
Z (ω∗)2
[
1 + (ω∗)1−σ
(
1− α
α
)σ] σσ−1
< 0.
19Note that the opposite pattern obtains if the capital-labor ratio is reduced from the initial
point of normalization: a high-σ country frees up more labor to do routine tasks and becomes
routine input abundant. When we turn to the trade predictions, our maintained assumption is
that a rising capital-labor ratio is a pervasive pattern of real-world technological change. Hence,
the empirically relevant case is the one where labor is becoming more and more scarce.
20This is a feature of the CES production function: holding the input bundle constant, output
is strictly increasing in σ (Klump et al., 2012).
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production will be higher in both countries, but increases especially in the high-σ
country. Its higher elasticity parameter implies less of a productivity penalty for an
unbalanced factor ratio.
2.6 Implications of opening up to trade
We now investigate the effect of substitutability between capital and labor in routine
production on the pattern of comparative advantage. To accomplish this in a static
model, we compare how countries with different σ parameters adjust to the same
exogenous shock. In particular, we consider an increase in the capital stock which
requires a reallocation of labor to achieve a new equilibrium. To abstract from other
channels of comparative advantage, we assume that both countries have identical
endowments of primitive factors, capital and labor, at all times. It is the optimal
allocation of labor to routine or non-routine tasks that determines the available
quantities of produced factors, abstract labor and routine intermediates, that are
used in the two final goods sectors. The equilibrium is fully determined by the
relative factor price ratio that clears labor and capital markets.
After a capital injection, the difference in substitutability creates an incentive to
trade, even for countries with identical endowments that initially produce the same
output bundle. The pattern of comparative advantage that arises can be determined
from the comparative statics of the relative factor price ratio with respect to σ.
However, as we illustrate in Appendix D, without normalizing the CES function
this leads to a circularity. The impact of σ on the pattern of trade depends on the
effective labor cost, i.e., whether wi/ri exceeds (1− αi)/αi or not, while αi depends
on σ itself.
Hence, we need to work with the normalized CES function. Given the pattern
of specialization in autarky, establishing the main result is straightforward. We
have already shown that in response to capital deepening, the equilibrium (Lai /Mi)
∗
ratio is increasing in σ. As capital accumulates and labor becomes more scarce,
the high-σ country becomes relatively abstract labor abundant (compared to the
low-σ country). Higher substitutability dampens the necessary factor price change
that is needed to absorb a shock to factor endowments. Capital deepening raises
the relative wage in both countries, but less so in the high-σ country which adjusts
more in quantities and less in prices.
The direction of trade then follows from the usual reasoning in the HO model.
Both countries acquire a comparative advantage in the good that is intensive in
their abundant factor. We obtain an adjusted HO prediction in this case, as the
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relevant production factors for the two final good sectors are not exogenously given,
but produced through the equilibrium labor allocation. After a capital increase, the
high-σ country specializes in the good intensive in abstract labor. More generally,
the high-σ country specializes in the good that uses more intensively the produced
factor that itself requires relatively more of the relatively scarce primitive factor.
In this condition, the relative scarcity of the primitive factor is defined in terms of
deviation from the point of normalization, while the relative intensity of use of the
produced factor is determined by technology, in the canonical HO way.
Three implications of the free trade equilibrium are worth highlighting. First,
equalization of final good prices is obtained through further divergence between
countries of the capital intensity in routine production. In the autarky equilib-
rium, capital accumulation creates a wedge between the marginal product ratios
(MPLm/MPK) for the two countries that differ in input substitutability. In turn,
this leads to a wedge in the relative produced factor prices (w/Pm) and thus a wedge
in the relative final good prices in the two countries.21 Once they open up to trade,
the only way that the wage to routine input price ratio can increase in the high-σ
country is by increasing its relative real wage ωA/ωB. This requires a movement
of labor out of routine production.22 Hence, the high-σ country—where capital
deepening leads to a comparative advantage in the non-routine intensive good—is
characterized by relatively high capital intensity in routine production in autarky,
and this relative capital intensity increases further when the countries open up to
trade.
Second, as in the canonical HO model, opening up to trade equalizes the final
good prices which leads to factor price equalization for w/Pm, the relative price ratio
for the produced factors. Factor price equalization does not obtain for the primitive
factors, however. The gap in the relative price of the primitive factors w/r will be
lower than under autarky, but not be eliminated entirely. This can be seen from
equation (7) which shows that the price for the routine input is a CES price index
of the two primitive factor prices. Hence, the relationship between w/Pm and w/r
depends on the σi parameter. When the first ratio equalizes between countries, the
second cannot. In our model, there is no factor price equalization for the primitive
factors because institutional or cultural differences that affect the flexibility of input
substitution lead to different production technologies in the two countries. These
21The high-σ country will have a lower relative wage, MPLm/MPK ratio, wage to routine input
price ratio, and a lower relative price for the final good that is intensive in non-routine tasks.
22The relative wage rate will equal labor’s marginal productivity in routine production and this
is increasing in capital intensity.
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patterns are shown formally in Appendix E.
Third, we already discussed that capital deepening raises real wages, but less so
in the high-σ country. At the same time, there is an efficiency effect associated with
σ in the CES function: holding the other parameters (α and Z) fixed, increasing
the production factors raised output M more with higher σ. As a result, capital
deepening produces higher total benefits in the high-σ country, but compared to the
low-σ country they flow more to capital owners and less to workers. The standard
HO finding that gains from trade flow disproportionately to the scarce factor still
applies and this favors workers in the high-σ country. As a result, we cannot tell in
general in which country workers gain most from capital deepening, but we know
that workers gain relatively more in the high-σ country under free trade than under
autarky.
Finally, our findings imply that higher capital-labor substitutability mitigates re-
source scarcity. It reflects the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy when
reallocation is needed, as in the adjustment to factor-biased technological growth.
The corollary for the pattern of trade is that the high-σ country specializes in the fi-
nal good that uses the relatively scarce factor—which we assumed to be labor—more
intensively. This is a restatement of the result in Arrow et al. (1961), studied in a
growth context by Klump and de la Grandville (2000), that economies with higher
labor substitution are better able to mitigate labor scarcity and achieve higher wel-
fare because they have more incentive to accumulate capital. Endogenizing capital
accumulation is left for future work, but it is likely to reinforce our results.23
3 Data
As is standard since Bowen et al. (1987) and Debaere (2003), our empirical analysis
is based on three types of data. Bilateral export flows at the product level are used
to construct the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are interactions of
industry-level indicators of input intensity, in particular the routine-intensity, and
country-level indicators of the corresponding endowments, including factor endow-
ments, quality of institutions, and cultural differences.
23We find that the return to capital falls by less in the high-σ country under capital deepening,
giving it ceteris paribus higher incentives to accumulate capital. This process would lead to a
further release of labor from routine tasks, further increasing the relative abundance of abstract
labor in the high-σ country but also reducing the wedge in the autarky factor prices. Stokey (1996)
performs a related exercise, but in a one-sector model where no trade is possible.
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Bilateral exports
Bilateral exports are reported in the UN Comtrade database and we use the 2017
release of the BACI harmonized version. Gaulier and Zignago (2010) describe an
earlier release. The model predicts the cross-sectional export specialization, but we
keep three years in the sample—1995, 2005, and 2015—to investigate whether the
fit of the model has improved or deteriorated over the last two decades. We average
exports over two adjacent years to smooth out annual fluctuations.24 Products are
observed at the 6-digit detail of the Harmonized System (HS) and mapped into 4-
digit NAICS sectors using a concordance constructed by Pierce and Schott (2012).
We construct two separate samples that are limited to two different groups of
exporters. In the ‘large exporters sample’ we keep bilateral exports that originate
from the 50 largest exporters in the world (excluding fossil fuels). On the import-
side, we keep trade flows towards those same 50 destinations separate and aggregate
the remaining countries, which together account for less than 10% of global trade,
into 10 separate regional blocs. In the ‘EU sample’, we keep only exports from the
28 EU members states (Belgium and Luxembourg are combined) and use the same
set of countries on the import side.
As a robustness check, we also use value added trade as dependent variable. For
this analysis we rely on the sectoral information in theWorld Input-Output Database
(WIOD).25 We follow Los et al. (2016) who illustrate how to construct a measure
of value added trade from the input-output table using an intuitive ‘hypothetical
extraction’ method. It takes the difference between observed GDP in a country
and what would have resulted if final demand from a single trading partner were
removed from the world economy, leaving all other sources of demand and input-
output relationships unaffected.
Industry-level input intensity
The key explanatory variable is the routine task intensity by industry, which is
represented by the parameter βg in the model. We use the ranking of routine
intensity constructed by Autor et al. (2003) for 77 U.S. industries at the 4-digit
NAICS level. It is a weighted average of the routine task intensity by occupation
using the employment shares of occupations in each industry in 1977 as weights.
By using employment shares that pre-date the recent process of automation, the
ranking is intended to capture sectors’ technological features that determine routine
24For 1995 and 2005 we use the average export flows for 1995-1996 and 2005-2006; given that
2015 is the last year included in the dataset we average with the preceding year: 2014-2015.
25We used the latest release, for 2016, which can be downloaded from http://www.wiod.org/.
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intensity.26
As control variables, we include additional industry characteristics that represent
other dimensions of the production technology. Physical capital and human capi-
tal intensity are included to capture the effects of the traditional HO mechanism.
Following Nunn (2007) and Chor (2010), we measure these by the U.S.’ values for
the real capital stock per employee and the ratio of non-production workers to total
employment from the NBER-CES database.
We further include two characteristics that capture industries’ reliance on do-
mestic institutions. External capital dependence, introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), is measured as the fraction of total capital expenditures not financed by
internal cash flow. This is calculated at the firm level in the Compustat database.
The median value within each ISIC 2-digit industry is assigned to the corresponding
4-digit NAICS industries. Finally, the fraction of differentiated inputs in total input
expenditure, using the liberal definition, is taken directly from Nunn (2007).
Country-level endowments
We follow the literature regarding endowments that are expected to give countries a
comparative advantage along the four dimensions of factor intensity that we control
for. Physical and human capital endowments are constructed from the Penn World
Tables.27 The physical capital stock is measured using constant national prices and
converted into USD at current exchange rates. To obtain a capital-labor ratio, we
divide by the number of employees multiplied by the average annual hours worked.
Human capital is proxied by average years of schooling.
Two dimensions of institutional quality, financial development and rule of law,
are conducive to industries with, respectively, a high external capital dependency
and a high fraction of differentiated inputs. Financial development is measured by
the amount of credit extended by banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to
the private sector, normalized by GDP. This is taken from the most recent version of
the World Bank’s Financial Development and Structure Dataset.28 The ability and
effectiveness of contract enforcement is proxied by the ‘rule of law’ index published
as part of the World Bank Governance Indicators database.29
26Autor et al. (2003) show that routine intensive industries, measured this way, replaced labor
with machines and increased demand for nonroutine labor at above-average rates.
27The 9.1 version was downloaded from https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/.
28The July 2018 version was downloaded from https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/
gfdr/data/financial-structure-database/.
29Available online at https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/.
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We use time-varying information on endowments for the same three years as the
export flows—1995, 2005, and 2015—and similarly use two-year averages to smooth
out annual fluctuations.
There exists no literature that establishes which country-level endowments give
a comparative advantage in (non-)routine intensive production. We will investigate
for a number of observable characteristics whether they have predictive power for
the routine specialization that we estimate in a first stage. According to our theory,
these would be factors that determine the ease of substituting between capital and
labor in production. Throughout, we include GDP per capita (taken from the Penn
World Tables) as a general control for development.
First, we consider whether the widely used rule of law indicator predicts routine
specialization. Following the labor literature, we next consider the role of formal
labor market institutions, as measured by the stringency of employment protection
legislation (EPL). This index is constructed by the OECD and discussed in Nicoletti
et al. (2000). We also use a broad index of labor quality, the ‘ability to perform’
measure also used in Costinot (2009) and developed by a private firm, Business
Environment Risk Intelligence. It is a synthetic index of worker attributes that
combines behavioral norms in the workforce, such as work ethic, with the quality of
human capital and physical characteristics, such as healthiness.
The degree of internal mobility measures the prevalence of adjustment in a ge-
ographic dimension. It is measured as the fraction of the population residing in
a different region than their place of birth, a coarse measure of workforce mobil-
ity.30 If workers tend to move easily between locations, they might display a similar
flexibility substituting between sectors or occupations. Finally, we consider two cul-
tural traits that could pre-dispose workers to move between sectors if opportunities
present themselves. From the six dimensions of national culture introduced by Hof-
stede (1980), we consider ‘long-term orientation’ and ‘uncertainty avoidance’ most
suitable in our context.
Where possible, we use the values of the country characteristics for the same year
as the trade flows. Most variables, e.g. the rule of law index, change only slightly
over time and the cultural traits do not have any time variation. This stability
is not unexpected and is consistent with our interpretation of these measures as
exogenously given, relatively immutable country characteristics that help determine
sectoral specialization.
30This information is taken from OECD’s Labor Market Statistics database.
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4 Empirical model
Our empirical strategy follows the two-step approach of Costinot (2009). In a first
step, we estimate for each country the extent of revealed comparative advantage in
sectors that are intensive in routine tasks. In a second step, we regress the obtained
ranking on country characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the ease of
labor reallocation across tasks. In a final analysis, once we have determined which
endowments or institutions are conducive to (non-)routine production, we show
results for a single-step analysis, including the interaction between routine intensity
and the relevant country characteristic.
The first step in evaluating the predictions of our model is to recover the direc-
tion of export specialization of each country with respect to routine intensity. We
estimate the following equation
lnXijg = γi rg +
∑
t∈ k,h,f,c
γt I
t
i tg + τij + τjg + ijg. (21)
The dependent variable is bilateral exports from exporter i to importer j in industry
g. The comparative advantage in the routine dimension is captured by the country-
specific coefficient γi that interacts with the sectoral routine task intensity rg, a
country-invariant measure of sectoral technology. A high (positive) value for γi
indicates that the composition of country i’s export bundle is correlated positively
with the the routine-intensity of those sectors.
To control for other mechanisms that can explain the exporter-sector special-
ization, we include four interaction terms between a sector-specific technology di-
mension (tg) and a country-specific endowment (I
t
i ). The four terms are for the
two traditional HO mechanisms, physical (k) and human capital (h) intensity times
endowment, as well as external capital dependence of the industry times financial
development of the country (f), and importance of differentiated inputs times the
quality of contract-enforcing institutions (c).
Equation (21) includes a pair of interaction fixed effects to control for alterna-
tive explanations of trade volumes. The bilateral exporter-importer fixed effects
τij absorb gravity effects, including exporter and importer country characteristics,
e.g. size or multilateral resistance, as well as any form of bilateral trade friction, e.g.
proximity or historical ties. The destination-sector fixed effects τjg capture variation
in import barriers, preferences, or business cycles in importing countries. We do not
exploit the time dimension, but estimate equation (21) separately for the three years
that we consider. This allows both sets of fixed effects and the γi coefficients to vary
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entirely flexibly over time.
The second step in our analysis is to connect the estimated routine intensity
of exports to one or more country characteristics. We wish to find out whether
observables that are plausible proxies for the country-specific ease of reallocating
labor across tasks (the σ parameter in our model) have the predicted correlation
with export specialization. We regress γˆit, the countries’ ranking by routine intensity
estimated using specification (21) by year, on the various candidate institutional
dimensions Irit:
γˆit = δ0 + δ1GDP/capitait + δr I
r
it + γt + i, (22)
for r ∈ {1, ..., 6}.
We include GDP per capita to control for the level of development as well a
time fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is δr, which we expect to be negative
for dimensions that are expected to have a positive correlation with σ, i.e., rule of
law, quality to perform, long-term orientation, and internal mobility. For country
characteristics with an expected negative correlation with σ, i.e., the stringency of
employment protection legislation and uncertainty avoidance, we expect a positive
sign as they are likely to induce specialization in routine-intensive sectors.
In a final analysis, we perform the estimation in a single step:
lnXijg = γr I
r
i rg +
∑
t∈ k,h,f,c
γt I
t
i tg + τij + τjg + ijg. (23)
Compared to specification (21), we replaced the country-specific coefficient γi with
γr I
r
i , inserting the country endowment found to predict routine specialization in
specification (22). This specification is estimated separately by year.
Finally, taking into account the increased international integration of supply
chains, especially in the EU context, we use value added trade instead of gross
exports as the dependent variable to test our hypothesis, and as a further robustness
check.
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5 Results
5.1 Step 1: Revealed comparative advantage in routine tasks
We estimate each country’s specialization in routine versus non-routine tasks using
specification (21). Figure 1 shows the estimates of γi on the sample of 50 largest
exporters and Figure 2 the estimates on the EU sample. Table F.1 and Table F.2
in the Appendix contain all point estimates and standard errors for both samples.
Before estimation, we standardize all variables by subtracting the mean and
dividing by the standard deviation over the respective samples. As a result, the
magnitudes of the coefficients are in terms of standard deviations: How many stan-
dard deviations do exports change on average when the routine-intensity indicator
is one standard deviation higher? This interpretation is only approximate due to
the fixed effects, which all need to be held constant when evaluating the effect of a
change in routine intensity.
The included fixed effects implicitly normalize the γi estimates to average zero
over the entire sample.31 A negative coefficient only implies that the country spe-
cializes less in routine-intensive industries than the average country. Given that the
sample is almost balanced over exporters, by construction half of the countries show
positive and the other half negative point estimates.
The top panel in Figure 1 shows the country-average of the estimates obtained
using separate regressions for each of the three years. The estimates without the
I ti tg interaction controls are on the horizontal axis and the corresponding estimates
including the controls are on the vertical axis. The countries towards the left, in
particular Japan, Singapore, Finland, Sweden, and Israel, tend to specialize in non-
routine intensive products. The next cluster of countries is also intuitive, with
Ireland, Switzerland, and the United States. At the other end of the spectrum (on
the right), are countries with a revealed comparative advantage in routine-intensive
industries. Here we find more developing or emerging economies, first Peru and
Vietnam, followed by Argentina and Chile. Exports of New Zealand, which is well-
known to specialize in primary products, and Turkey, which is an assembly hub for
EU-bound exports, are also highly routine intensive.
It is intuitive that the estimates with controls on the vertical axis are lower
in absolute value than those without controls. Estimates on the left tend to lie
31Because of the two sets of fixed effects, which include both the i and g dimension, one of the
country-specific γi coefficients cannot be estimated and is normalized to zero. The point estimates
in the figures are re-normalized to have an average of zero over the different countries.
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Figure 1: (Non-)Routine export specialization in sample of 50 largest exporters
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(a) Estimates with and without Heckscher-Olin interaction terms
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(b) Estimates for 1995 versus 2015 (with controls)
28
above the 45-degree line and on the right below the dashed line. The solid, fitted
line confirms that the results change towards zero if controls are included, but the
average change is minor. The adjustment is most notable for countries with lower
capital endowments or lower institutional quality than their most important trading
partners, such as Mexico, India, and Turkey. Overall, however, the pattern of routine
specialization is relatively unaffected by the inclusion of the four sets of interaction
controls that capture alternative explanations for export specialization.
One more notable pattern is the large difference in specialization between some
countries that share similar levels of development. Finland and Sweden have much
lower (more negative) point estimates than Norway or Denmark. The contrast be-
tween France and Italy or between Spain and Portugal is also quite large. The same
holds on the other continents: in Latin America, Mexico is much less specialized
in routine-intensive industries than Argentina or Chile; in Asia, Malaysia much less
than Thailand.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the point estimates for 2015 on the vertical
axis against the corresponding estimates for 1995 on the horizontal axis, including
the HO interaction controls in both years.32 Over this twenty year period, coun-
tries’ specialization by routine-intensity is relatively stable. Large deviations from
the 45-degree line are rare. The two largest changes are for Vietnam and the Czech
Republic which both specialize away from the routine-intensive sectors. Spain, the
United Kingdom and Italy are among the countries with the largest change in the
opposite direction, towards routine-intensive industries. The flattening of the solid
line suggests that in 2015 the routine intensity of a sector has somewhat less pre-
dictive power for a country’s exports than in 1995.
In Figure 2, we show comparable estimates on the sample of EU countries, includ-
ing only intra-EU trade in the dependent variable. The relative ranking of countries
is broadly consistent with Figure 1, suggesting that the overall and intra-EU ex-
port bundles of most countries are highly correlated. This is not surprising as the
intra-EU share of exports is very high for most member states. Among the countries
that appear in both samples, only the United Kingdom and Slovakia show a notably
lower specialization towards routine-intensive sectors on the intra-EU sample. The
difference is especially large for Slovakia, indicating that its intra-EU exports are
systematically different from its extra-EU exports. The emergence of a large Slovak
automotive industry notably shifted its intra-EU specialization towards non-routine
industries, with the point estimate declining from 0.027 to -0.053.
32For almost all countries, the 2005 estimates are intermediate, as shown in Table F.2.
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Figure 2: (Non-)Routine export specialization among EU member states
FIN
IRL
SWE
GBR
FRADEUMLT
NLDAUT
SVKHUNCZE
SVN
BELCYP
GRCESPPOL
DNKITAHRV
EST
BGR
LVA
PRT
LTUROM
-0
.1
5
-0
.0
5
0.
05
0.
15
es
tim
at
es
 w
ith
 c
on
tro
ls
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
estimates without controls
fitted values 45 degree line
(a) Estimates with and without Heckscher-Olin interaction terms
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A few other changes over time are worth pointing out. In the full sample, the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany specialized moderately in non-routine in-
dustries in 1995, each with a coefficient of around -0.08 (at rank 10 to 12). This
specialization diminished for all three countries by 2015, the coefficient estimates
rose to around -0.035 (at rank 14 to 16). Limited to EU trade, we see the same
evolution for France and Germany, both dropping 3 places in the ranking among
EU countries, while the United Kingdom maintained its specialization and its rank.
Similarly as France and Germany, a few other older member states go down in the
ranking. Belgium, Italy, and Spain had a negative or in the case of Italy a very low
positive coefficient in 1995, but by 2015 they all three show a clear revealed com-
parative advantage in routine-intensive industries. Given that we only uncover a
relative specialization, the reverse pattern must hold for some other countries. The
point estimates decline for Cyprus, Hungary, Estonia, and Slovenia.
In the top panel of Figure 2, it is remarkably how invariant the estimates are to
the inclusion of the HO control interactions. Results are almost identical with or
without; the fitted line lies almost on top of the dashed 45-degree line. It implies
that the predictive power of routine intensity for trade flows is orthogonal to the
most important endowment or institution-based explanations in the literature.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows a convergence in export orientation. Coun-
tries with negative coefficients in 1995 are systematically above the 45-degree line
in 2015 and the reverse is true for countries with positive coefficients in 1995. Most
countries see their γi coefficient shrink towards zero. As a result, routine-intensity
has less predictive power for countries’ export bundle in 2015 than in 1995. This
also appears as a decline in the standard deviation across the point estimates in
Table F.1 from 0.072 to 0.060. However, in the middle of the graph we see two clus-
ters of countries with relatively similar export orientation in 1995, but a different
evolution in the next 2 decades. Spain, Belgium, and Italy, as mentioned already,
but also Croatia and Poland specialize more in routine-intensive industries, while
Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic change in the opposite
direction.
While there is a negative correlation between GDP per capita and specialization,
it is by no means perfect. In particular, Italy sees a much stronger and Slovakia a
much weaker specialization in routine-intensive products than would be predicted by
their level of development. We next evaluate which observable differences between
countries help explain the different specializations.
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5.2 Step 2: Country characteristics that predict (non-)routine
specialization
To learn which country characteristics correlate with the pattern of routine versus
non-routine specialization that was recovered in step 1, we report the estimates of
specification (22) in Table 1. Each of the six country characteristics is introduced
separately in columns 1–6 and jointly in column 7. In the last regression we omit the
two characteristics with most missing observations to preserve the sample size. The
reported estimates are standardized β-coefficients to make the absolute magnitudes
of coefficients on the different variables comparable.
GDP per capita is always included as a control variable because countries at
different levels of development are likely to have different institutional quality and
industrial structure. Because most country characteristics that we consider are cor-
related to some extent with the level of development, we include an explicit control
to facilitate interpretation. Not surprisingly, GDP per capita is always negatively
related to the extent of specializing in routine-intensive industries.
More surprising is the insignificant coefficient on the rule of law variable in the
top panel, for the sample of large exporters. To some extent, this is due to the high
correlation with GDP per capita, showing a partial correlation coefficient of 0.61.
Without the control, the coefficient on rule of law becomes -0.455 and significant at
the 1% level. The same pattern is true on the EU sample. With GDP per capita
included, the coefficient on rule of law is -0.313 and barely significantly different
from zero. Without the control variable it becomes -0.670 with a t-statistic of 4.5.
These results highlight that interpreting the effects of rule of law warrants some
caution.
The other columns in panel (a) indicate that four of the five observables have
predictive power, even when we control for the level of development. Countries
with a high workforce quality are especially likely to specialize in sectors that are
not intensive in routine tasks. The ‘ability to perform’ variable captures a variety
of workforce features such as worker behavior (e.g. punctuality), workplace norms
(e.g. taking responsibility), human capital, and good health. It explains fully 44%
of the variation in the dependent variable.33
More interestingly, the two dimensions of national culture are correlated with
export specialization in the predicted direction. Countries where workers are more
33The high significance is in spite of an even stronger correlation with GDP per capita than rule
of law, showing a partial correlation statistic of 0.75 overall and even 0.88 in 1995.
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Table 1: Country determinants for routine versus non-routine export specialization
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a)
(a) Sample of 50 largest exporters
log(GDP/capita) -0.541*** -0.061 -0.667*** -0.603*** -0.621*** -0.662*** -0.091
(.120) (.127) (.118) (.075) (.072) (.121) (.163)
Rule of law -0.081 0.122
(.108) (.119)
Ability to perform -0.721*** -0.590***
(.115) (.119)
 0.053
(.091)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.202*** 0.137*
(.067) (.077)
Long-term orientation -0.294*** -0.324***
(.065) (.065)
Internal migration -0.172*
(.092)
Observations 150 120 102 150 150 90 120
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.425 0.257 0.324 0.371 0.265 0.525
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b)
(b) Sample of EU member states
log(GDP/capita) -0.542** -0.174 -0.788*** -0.790*** -0.884*** -0.516*** -0.454
(.218) (.313) (.139) (.121) (.120) (.184) (.225)
Rule of law -0.313* -0.229
(.160) (.172)
Ability to perform -0.450**
(.207)
 0.358*** 0.289***
(.099) (.105)
Uncertainty avoidance 0.226** 0.158
(.089) (.119)
Long-term orientation 0.063 0.027
(.088) (.097)
Internal migration -0.358***
(.123)
Observations 81 48 63 81 81 54 63
Adjusted R2 0.437 0.242 0.414 0.455 0.412 0.267 0.443
Dependent variable is the country-specific extent of specialization in routine-
intensive industries estimated in the first stage
Strictness of EPL
Note: The dependent variable is the country-specific estimates of routine-specialization in exports (the point estimates 
reported in Tables F.1 and F.2). EPL stands for employment protection legislation. Regressions include year fixed effects. 
The reported statistics are standardized β-coefficients which measure effects in standard errors. Standard errors are in 
brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Strictness of EPL
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risk averse or have a more short-term orientation tend to specialize relatively more in
routine-intensive tasks. It is plausible that both of these features are inversely related
to the σ coefficient in the model that governs the capital-labor substitution. The
extent to which countries adjust their production structure when more productive
capital is introduced is likely to be lower when workers and managers are highly risk
averse and have no long-term outlook.
In the micro-foundation of our production function, we showed that firing re-
strictions naturally have such an effect. The strictness of employment protection
legislation (EPL) has the predicted positive sign on both samples, but it is only
a significant predictor of export specialization on the EU sample with countries
that are relatively similar in most other dimensions. Among EU countries, EPL
is the most robust predictor of export specialization when different dimensions are
included simultaneously. Countries that enacted laws and regulations to make fir-
ing workers more costly and to restrict temporary employment tend to specialize
in more routine-intensive tasks. Note that these results should not be interpreted
causally. While EPL might have caused or contributed to the trade specialization,
as in our model, it is also possible that labor regulations were enacted in response
to sectoral specialization.
The last variable, the extent of internal migration, has the predicted negative
sign in both samples. It is only observed for two thirds of the countries in the
sample, though, and it is unlikely to have the same interpretation in large and small
countries.
Because the dependent variable has no clear cardinal interpretation, we also
implemented a more flexible estimation approach as a robustness check. We can
treat the dependent variable as an ordinal variable and estimate specification (22)
as an ordered probit model. This follows the spirit of the rank comparisons in Bowen
et al. (1987). It makes the point estimates not comparable and harder to interpret,
but the signs for the different country characteristics are always unchanged. In this
case, it is preferable to estimate separate specifications for each year, rather than
pooling and including time fixed-effects, but most of the t-statistics did not decline
much even on samples only one third the size.34
34Results available upon request.
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5.3 Single-step estimation
Now that we have a sense which attributes make countries specialize in routine-
intensive industries, we can include an interaction between the routineness indicator
rg and the preferred country ‘endowment’ I
r
i directly in the initial regression. Based
on the results for the EU sample, we interact rg with the EPL measure. The results
on the large exporters sample highlighted the importance of national culture and
we interact rg with the average of uncertainty avoidance and short-term orientation.
Results in Table 2 are shown separately for the two samples and for each of the
three years.
On the sample of large exporters, human capital is the most important determi-
nant of countries’ export specialization. Capital intensity and the ability to enforce
contracts for differentiated inputs also show the predicted positive sign in most spec-
ifications, but their predictive power is much lower. The combination of routine task
intensity and the national culture indicator is remarkably important as well. It is
easily the second most important predictor. Even routineness interacted with EPL
turns out to be a strong predictor of export specialization, even on this sample.
On the sample of EU countries, results are rather similar. Both mechanisms
that we have introduced show the expected sign and point estimates are remarkably
large. The interaction of routine intensity and EPL predicts export specialization
equally well as human capital. Culture is not as important as on the broader sample
of panel (a), but it still shows a robust and strong effect. Especially in the last year
of the sample, when EU countries have probably converged in economic structure
and institutions, the interaction of culture and routine-intensity has become the
most important predictor.
5.4 Results using value added trade
As a final robustness check, we investigate whether the results differ using as de-
pendent variable value added trade rather than gross exports. Due to integration of
production processes across borders, the gross export flows in the official statistics
are often not representative of the underlying exchange of value added. Given that
our model abstracts away from trade in intermediate goods, it is more representa-
tive of value added trade. In addition, using value added trade allows us to avoid
the so-called Rotterdam effect in Europe, where trade is shipped through a port in
another country.
This analysis is limited to the level of detail in the WIOD. It contains 43 coun-
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Table 2: Relative importance of different Heckscher-Ohlin mechanisms
p
(1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a)
(a) Sample of 50 largest exporters
Routineness 0.139*** 0.115*** 0.115***
  * employment protection regulation (.011) (.010) (.009)
Routineness 0.224*** 0.217*** 0.189***
  * culture (.009) (.008) (.007)
Capital-intensity 0.004 0.038*** 0.0004 0.032*** 0.003 0.036***
  * K/L ratio for entire economy (.004) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Human capital-intensity 0.424*** 0.358*** 0.450*** 0.369*** 0.478*** 0.426***
  * School enrollment (.012) (.008) (.011) (.008) (.012) (.009)
Differentiated input share 0.046*** 0.111*** -0.002 0.089*** -0.005 0.068***
  * rule of law (.005) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
External capital dependency -0.025*** -0.037*** 0.004 -0.014*** 0.020*** 0.001
  * financial development (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002)
Observations 160,694 219,894 177,821 253,409 183,935 265,276
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b)
(b) Sample of EU member states
Routineness 0.169*** 0.202*** 0.162***
  * employment protection regulation (.019) (.018) (.017)
Routineness 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.111***
  * culture (.017) (.016) (.014)
Capital-intensity 0.002 0.001 -0.012 0.016** -0.008 0.025***
  * K/L ratio for entire economy (.009) (.008) (.009) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Human capital-intensity 0.236*** 0.198*** 0.185*** 0.164*** 0.180*** 0.039
  * School enrollment (.025) (.025) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024)
Differentiated input share 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.055*** 0.098*** 0.041*** 0.060***
  * rule of law (.010) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.006)
External capital dependency -0.042*** -0.049*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.001 0.003
  * financial development (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) (.004)
Observations 40,899 48,988 43,962 54,561 44,977 56,556
Dependent variable is the country-specific extent of specialization in 
routine-intensive industries estimated in the first stage
Note: Dependent variable is the log of bilateral exports at the industry level. Explanatory variables are the interactions 
between industry-level intensities and country-level endowments. "Culture" is the average between uncertainty avoidance 
and short-term orientation. All regressions include destination-industry and origin-destination fixed effects. The 
dependent and explanatory variables are standardized Z-variables such that the effects are measures in standard 
deviations. Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
1995 2005 2015
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tries and 56 sectors in total, but for comparability with the earlier results, we only
use a subset. We estimate specification (21) on the following two samples. The
intersection between the WIOD and the 50 largest exporters that we studied before
is a first sample of 36 countries. On the import side we include information from the
‘rest-of-the-world’ aggregate and we combine the imports from 7 small EU countries.
The second sample consists of the same 27 EU member states as before and we again
restrict it to intra-EU trade. Of the 56 sectors, only 17 are in manufacturing, for
which we observe the routineness indicator which we need to aggregate to this level.
In Figure F.1 in the Appendix, we plot the estimates obtained on the WIOD data
for 2014 (the latest year in the WIOD) on the vertical axis against the 2015 estimates
for gross exports on the horizontal axis. These estimates differ somewhat from those
reported in Figures 1 and 2 due to the different country sample and industry detail.
Overall, the ranking of countries is very similar with a partial correlation of more
than 0.8.
Most countries are fairly close to the 45-degree line and the broad ranking is
maintained. A few countries, in particular Denmark, the United States, and Taiwan,
are found to specializemore in non-routine industries based on the value added trade
measure. In the case of Denmark, it moves the country closer to the position of the
other Scandinavian countries and also the other two changes are plausible. We find
the reverse pattern for Slovakia: it is found to specialize more in routine industries
for value added trade than for gross exports. This difference is caused by the lower
weight on its automotive sector, as gross exports are much higher than value added
trade for this highly non-routine product. This industry also explains Slovakia’s
greater specialization in non-routine products for within-EU than for global trade
that we mentioned before.
On the EU sample, in the bottom panel of Figure F.1, deviations from the
45-degree line are somewhat larger. But the relationship between the two sets of
estimates is also very strong in this case. Their partial correlation is 0.91 and the
Spearman rank correlation is equally large at 0.89. Using the value added trade
measure does not change the earlier conclusions materially.
One interesting pattern is that the routineness indicator looses less of its pre-
dictive power over time for value added trade. When using gross exports as the
dependent variable, the country-specific γi coefficients are estimated closer to zero
on the 2015 data than on the 1995 data, especially for the EU sample. In panel (b)
of Figure 2, the slope of the fitted values line is clearly less steep than the 45-degree
line. In column (1) of Table 3, we show the standard deviation across countries of
the estimated γˆi coefficients. While the mean is always normalized to zero due to
37
Table 3: Standard deviation of γˆi estimates for EU countries
BACI data (76 sectors) WIOD data (17 sectors)
Gross exports Gross exports Value added trade
(1) (2) (3)
1995 3.12 2000 4.52 4.04
2005 3.47 2007 4.45 4.15
2015 2.56 2014 4.11 4.27
Note: The average estimate is always (implicitly) normalized to zero.
the included fixed effects, the standard deviation is lower in 2015 than in 1995.
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, we report comparable standard deviations
estimated on the WIOD data. This dataset has less sectoral detail, but we can use
both dependent variables on the same sample. The results based on gross exports,
in column (2), show a decline in dispersion, in line with the pattern in column (1).
The extent to which countries’ export bundles can be explained by the routineness
of sectors declines over time. In sharp contrast, the results based on value added
trade in column (3) do not show such a decline. If anything, the extent to which we
can predict countries’ trade patterns using sectoral routineness has improved over
time. Given that the value added content of trade better captures the production
taking place in the exporting country, it strengthens our findings.
6 Conclusion
We pin down a new mechanism behind comparative advantage that is based on
countries’ different ability to adjust to technological change. We build on a pattern
extensively documented in the labor literature, whereby more efficient machines dis-
place workers from codifiable (routine) tasks, and introduce the hypothesis that the
reallocation of labor across tasks is subject to frictions the importance of which
differs by country. Once we incorporate task routineness into a canonical 2× 2× 2
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the key feature of our model is that the relevant factor en-
dowments for the final good sectors are determined endogenously by the equilibrium
allocation of labor to routine and non-routine tasks.
The exact allocation depends on the ease of reallocating labor. We provide a
microfoundation that helps explain why the parameter that captures capital-labor
substitutability—which is generally perceived as an exogenous characteristic of the
production technology—may in fact be determined by the institutional environment.
Specifically, we show that any type of institutional characteristic that increases a
firm’s cost of adjusting the labor input, such as the rigidity of labor market institu-
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tions or the lack of publicly-financed active labor market policies, may increase the
shadow cost of switching to more productive capital. Hence, it will result in a lower
perceived capital-labor substitutability in routine production.
The key theoretical prediction of our model is that with capital deepening, coun-
tries with flexible reallocation of labor become relatively abundant in non-routine
labor. As a result, they specialize in goods that use non-routine labor more inten-
sively.
We follow the two-step approach of Costinot (2009) to verify this prediction in
the data. We first estimate the revealed comparative advantage in routine versus
non-routine products for each country and we next relate them to country-level
characteristics of labor market institutions and cultural norms likely to influence
adjustment to new technology.
For a sample of the 50 largest exporters, we find that an index of labor force
quality (‘ability to perform’) and a cultural indicator of ‘long-term orientation’ both
correlate strongly with the revealed (non-)routine comparative advantage measure.
For the sample of EU countries, the correlation is strongest for strictness of employ-
ment protection legislation.
To compare the predictive power of our newmechanism relative to other Heckscher-
Ohlinmechanisms, we can also evaluate its prediction in a single step. For the sample
of large exporters, we find that only human capital is a better predictor of trade
flows than the interaction of routineness with the cultural measure. For EU coun-
tries, the interaction term of routiness and EPL predicts on par with the human
capital variable.
To account for the increased importance of global value chains, we use value
added trade data from the World Input-Output Database as a robustness check.
The estimated measures of comparative advantage are found to correlate highly
with our baseline findings. Importantly, while the explanatory power of routiness
for gross exports declines over time, this is not the case for value added trade. That
is, the channel we have put forward in this paper keeps its explanatory power, when
we take into account the increased trade in intermediate products.
Our results have important policy implications. They illustrate that governments
can play a key role to ensure that the process of labor reallocation from tasks that
are substitutable with machines to tasks that are complementary with machines
proceeds quickly and smoothly. Indeed, workers are shown to benefit relatively more
from the process of technological change and from trade integration in institutional
environments that succeed in reducing the costs of labor reallocation across tasks.
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Appendix A Support for parameter assumptions
We estimate a separate production function for each country-sector to provide sup-
port for the assumed parameter heterogeneity in the model. We use the 2009 release
of the EU KLEMS database that is described in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). It
contains information on output, capital and labor use for 25 countries, 30 sectors,
and 25 years. While not ideal, we rely on observed schooling levels to distinguish
between abstract and routine labor input: routine labor is equated with employ-
ment of workers with a low schooling level and abstract labor with the two higher
schooling levels, middle and high.35 Real output and an index of capital services are
reported directly in the database.
The production function technology in equation (3) incorporates heterogeneity
along two dimensions. First, it assumes that sectors differ in the relative intensity
they use abstract labor and the routine input intermediate, which is captured by
the parameter βg. The assumption that industries can be ranked according to their
routine intensity has been adopted widely since the seminal work of Autor et al.
(2003) who pioneered measures of the task content of occupations. A sectoral mea-
sure of routine intensity is constructed by weighting the routine task intensity of
occupations by the composition of the workforce of each sector.
The second dimension of heterogeneity in the production function is cross-country
variation in the ease of substitution between (routine) labor and capital in the pro-
duction of the routine intermediate, which is represented by the parameter σi. Exist-
ing studies have assumed or estimated different rates of substitution between inputs
in the production of the routine input aggregate. For example, Autor et al. (2003)
and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) assume perfect substitutability (σ = +∞), Au-
tor and Dorn (2013) assume σ > 1, while Goos et al. (2014) estimate the elasticity of
substitution between the tasks required to generate industry output and find a value
slightly below one.36 Importantly, each of these studies looks at a single country
and assumes a constant value for the elasticity of substitution.
We evaluate whether the assumptions of sectoral heterogeneity in βg and cross-
country heterogeneity in σi are consistent with the data. We estimate a separate
production function for each country-sector combination, exploiting only variation
over time. Following Klump et al. (2012), we use the explicitly normalized version
35There is a strong negative correlation between the skill intensity and the routine intensity of
occupations, especially within manufacturing sectors.
36Goos et al. (2014) impose a capital-labor substitutability equal to one in the production of
each task.
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of the embedded CES function to guarantee that the estimated parameters have an
unambiguous structural interpretation.37 This is also convenient given that the flow
of real capital services is measured as a time index. Omitting the country-sector
subscripts on the variables and parameters, we estimate the following equation,
Yt = A
[
Lat
]1−β [
(1− π0)
(
Lmt
Lm0
)σ−1
σ
+ π0
(
Kt
K0
)σ−1
σ
] β σ
σ−1
, (A1)
to recover two coefficients, β and σ, for each country-sector pair. There is a lot of
heterogeneity in the estimated parameters. The median elasticity of substitution (σˆ)
in routine production is 1.75, but the interquartile range is (0.3, 20). The median
routine intensity (βˆ) is 0.19 and the interquartile range is (0.05, 0.40).
We next investigate which dimension, country or sector, has themost explanatory
power for the variation in either production function parameter. In the top panel of
Table A.1, we first show a reduced-form analysis using two input factor ratios that
can be observed without any estimation.
The share of abstract labor in total employment is directly influenced by the β
coefficient that captures the relative routine intensity of the sector. The σ parameter
plays only an indirect role. Regressing this variable on a full set of country and
sector-fixed effects shows that the sector dummies have the most explanatory power.
They explain 54.2% of the total sum of squares against only 28.5% for the country
dummies. Note that even if the β parameter was the same for all countries, we
would still expect the country dimension to have some explanatory power. Sectoral
specialization by country (for example driven by the mechanism in our model) would
still generate variation in the average employment ratio across countries.38
In contrast, the capital to routine labor ratio does not depend on the β coefficient.
This ratio has increased over time almost everywhere, but for a given change in the
factor price ratio (which is controlled for by year-fixed effects), its variation is a
function of the elasticity of substitution, i.e. of the σ parameter. The results in
Table A.1 indicate that the country dummies explain a lot more of the variation in
this ratio than sector-fixed effects.
Finally, in panel (b) of Table A.1, we confirm these results with a similar exer-
cise, but now directly explaining variation in the two estimated production function
37We force the β coefficient to lie between 0 and 0.6 and the σ coefficient between 0 and +∞.
38Moreover, the three skill levels are defined based on the country-specific schooling levels, which
itself introduces some cross-country variation in the average share of the skilled workforce over all
sectors.
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Table A.1: ANOVA analysis of input ratios and production function parameters
Sum of squares: level (and share) F-statistic (and p-value)
Dep. Var. Sector (33) Country (20) Year (25) Sector Country Year
(a) Observable variables(i)(
La
La+Lm
)
9.98 5.41 2.84 62.03 53.69
(100%) (54.2%) (28.5%) (0.00) (0.00)
ln
(
K
Lm
)
3843 466 789 1118 114.73 320.63 363.49
(100%) (12.1%) (20.5%) (29.1%) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(b) Estimated parameters
βˆig 25.52 5.30 2.67 6.03 5.01
(20.8%) (10.5%) (0.00) (0.00)
σˆig
(ii) 1636 191 217 1.03 1.93
(11.7%) (13.3%) (0.43) (0.01)
(i) The average input shares over the period are used
(ii) Only includes country-sector observations with σˆig < 20
coefficients. The β coefficient is predicted better by the sector dummies, while the
σ coefficient varies mostly across countries. In the latter case, the fraction of the
sum of squares that is explained by either set of fixed effects is relatively similar,
but there are many fewer countries than sectors and the F-statistic—which takes
the degrees of freedom into account—is almost twice as high for the country dum-
mies. If we follow the approach in the literature and constrain the routine intensity
β to be an industry-characteristic common to all countries, the contrast becomes
even larger. In that case the country-fixed effects explain four times as much of the
variation in the σˆig estimates.
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Appendix B Derivative of σL,K with respect to the
lay-off friction
Here, we show the effect of a change in the lay-off cost friction p on the elasticity of
substitution of the modified production function y = F (K,L)/(1 + pC(L)).
The elasticity is defined as
σL,K =
d(L/K)
dMRTS
MRTS
L/K
.
Since the lay-off cost is specified as a function of labor, we first need to relate
changes in L/K to changes in L. To do so, observe that staying on the isoquant of
the modified production function (5) implies:
dK =
y pC ′(L)−MPL
MPK
dL.
In addition, we have
d(L/K) =
1
K
dL− L
K2
dK,
and substituting for dK then yields
d(L/K) =
(
1
K
+
L
K2
MPL
MPK
− L
K2
pC F ′(L) y
MPK
)
dL. (B1)
We are now in a position to consider the elasticity of substitution, and to conduct
comparative statics with respect to the parameter p that measures the importance
of the labor market friction. In general, the marginal rate of technical substitution
for our modified production function takes the form:
MRTS =
MPK
MPL − pC ′(L) y .
Differentiating with respect to L/K gives:
dMRTS
d(L/K)
=
dMPK
d(L/K)
MPL − pC ′(L) y −
MPK
(
dMPL
d(L/K)
− pC ′′(L) y dL
d(L/K)
)
(MPL − pC ′(L) y)2 (B2)
In order to simplify the analysis, consider the case of perfect substitutes, i.e.
F (K,L) = K + L, which implies that both MPK and MPL equal one. Absent any
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labor market friction, the MRTS in this case is one, its derivative with respect to
L/K zero, and the elasticity of substitution infinite. This is clearly a limiting case,
but it serves as a useful illustration that introducing a labor market friction will
reduce the elasticity of substitution even in this case.
In the presence of a friction, the derivative of the marginal rate of substitution
(B2) in this case simplifies to:
dMRTS
d(L/K)
=
pC ′′(L)K2
(1− pC ′(L) y)2 .
Note that because of the (strictly) convex cost, this derivative is (strictly) positive.
The lower the factor input ratio L/K, the lower the derivative or slope of the
isoquant. Based on this derivative, the elasticity of substitution takes the form:
σL,K =
(1− pC ′(L) y)2 /L+ (1− pC ′ (L) y¯)3 /K
pC ′′(L) y
. (B3)
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Appendix C Solving the model: step-by-step
The model features three types of price-taking firms: one type produces the routine
intermediate, the other two types produce the two final goods. We solve the model
by deriving the cost-minimizing input choices for a representative firm of each of the
three types.
C.1 Routine production
The production function of an atomistic firm in routine production is:
Mif = Z
[
α(Kif )
σi−1
σi + (1− α)(Lmif )
σi−1
σi
] σi
σi−1
(2)
with wi the wage and ri the cost of capital. Its cost minimization problem is:⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
min
Lm, K
wiLmif + riKif
s.t. Mif ≤ Z
[
α(Kif )
σi−1
σi + (1− α)(Lmif )
σi−1
σi
] σi
σi−1
The ratio of the two first order conditions defines the relative factor demand as a
function of the factor price ratio:
Lmif
Kif
=
[
wi
ri
α
1− α
]−σi
. (C1)
We use this expression with the production function to write the conditional factor
demands as a function of output Mif and the factor price ratio:
Kif =
Mif
Z
[ri
α
]−σi [
ασir1−σii + (1− α)σiw1−σii
]− σi
σi−1 (C2)
Lmif =
Mif
Z
[
wi
1− α
]1−σi [
ασir−σii + (1− α)σiw1−σii
]− σi
σi−1 . (C3)
We then obtain the cost function for intermediate input producers by substituting
these conditional factor demands in the objective function. Dividing through by the
routine intermediate quantity Mif gives the unit cost, which equals the intermediate
input price
Pmi = C(wi, ri) =
1
Z
[
ασir1−σii + (1− α)σi w1−σii
]− 1
1−σi . (7)
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C.2 Final good production
The production function of a firm producing final good g is:
Yigf = zg (L
a
igf )
1−βg (Migf )βg , (1)
with factor prices Pmi and wi as given. Its cost minimization problem is⎧⎨
⎩
min
La, M
wiLaigf + P
m
i Migf
s.t. Yigf ≤ zg
(
Laigf
)1−βg
(Migf )
βg
The ratio of the two first order conditions defines the relative factor demand as a
function of the factor price ratio:
Laigf
Migf
=
1− βg
βg
Pmi
wi
. (C4)
Again, plugging this expression in the production function, we can write the condi-
tional factor demands as a function of output Yigf and the factor price ratio:
Laigf =
Yigf
zg
[
wi
Pmi
βg
1− βg
]−βg
Migf =
Yigf
zg
[
wi
Pmi
βg
1− βg
]1−βg
We obtain the cost of production by substituting these conditional factor demands
in the objective function. Dividing through by the final good quantity gives the unit
cost, which with perfect competition is also the final good price:
Pig = Cig(wi, Pmi ) =
1
zg
(
wi
1− βg
)1−βg (Pmi
βg
)βg
, ∀g ∈ {1, 2}. (8)
By replacing the price of the routine intermediate in (8) by its function of prim-
itive factor prices (7), we can express the price of each final good in terms of the
primitive factor prices, the wage and rental rate of capital:
Pig =
1
zg Zβg
[
wi
1− βg
]1−βg ⎡⎣(ασir1−σi + (1− α)σiw1−σii ) 11−σi
βg
⎤
⎦
βg
(C5)
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C.3 Relative supply of ‘produced’ factors
We next use the resource constraints for capital and labor. Capital market clearing
is straightforward because capital can only be used in routine production:
∑
f Kif =
K¯. We can rewrite the capital demand in routine production, equation (C3), as
Kif =
Mif
Z
[
1 +
wi
ri
(
wi/(1− α)
ri/α
)−σi]− σiσi−1
.
From this we find the optimal quantity of the routine intermediate Mi, and thus
how much labor to allocate to routine tasks, as a function of the capital endowment
and the relative factor price ratio by summing across all firms
∑
f
Mif = Mi = Z K¯ α
σi
σi−1
[
1 +
wi
ri
(
wi/(1− α)
ri/α
)−σi] σiσi−1
.
Labor market clearing then gives the total quantity of abstract labor that can be
used in the final good sectors as a function of the labor endowment and factor prices:
Lai = L¯ −
∑
f L
m
if (wi, ri;Kif ). The necessary expression for L
m
if is given directly by
the ratio of first order conditions in routine production (C1).
Optimal factor use in routine production together with market clearing for labor
and capital determines the relative supply of the produced factors. We express it as
a function of primitive endowments and the prices of the primitive factors as follows:
Lai
Mi
=
L¯− Lmi
Mi
=
L¯−
[
wi/(1−α)
ri/α
]−σi
K¯
ZK¯α
σi
σi−1
{
1 + wi
ri
[
wi/(1−α)
ri/α
]−σi} σiσi−1 . (9)
Equivalently, we can use (7) to write the relative factor supply as a function of
the wage and of the price of the routine input:
Lai
Mi
=
L¯− [ α
1−α
] σi
σi−1
[(
Pmi
wi
)1−σi
(1− α)−σiZ1−σi − 1
]− σi
σi−1
K¯
ZK¯α
σi
σi−1
[
1−
(
Pmi
wi
)−(1−σi)
(1− α)σiZ−(1−σi)
]− σi
σi−1
. (C6)
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C.4 The demand side
We have assumed a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function to represent preferences
over the two final goods: Ui =
∑
g θg ln(Qig). The budget constraint is
∑
g PigQig ≤
riK¯ + wiL¯. The ratio of a representative consumer’s two first order conditions gives
an expression of total expenditure on one good as a function of relative income
shares of each good and expenditure on the other good:
Pi2Qi2 =
θ2
θ1
Pi1Qi1. (C7)
By substitution in the final good prices (8), we can re-write this expression as a
function of the wage rate and the price of the routine input:
Qi1
Qi2
=
θ1z1β
β1
1 (1− β1)1−β1
θ2z2β
β2
2 (1− β2)1−β2
(
wi
Pmi
)β1−β2
. (10)
Alternatively, we can also write this expression as a function of the primitive factor
prices by using equation (C5) instead to eliminate the final good prices:
Qi1
Qi2
=
θ1z1β
β1
1 (1− β1)1−β1
θ2z2β
β2
2 (1− β2)1−β2
(Zwi)
β1−β2 [ασir1−σi + (1− α)σiw1−σii ]β2−β11−σi . (C8)
C.5 Relative demand for ‘produced’ factors
We now combine optimal factor allocation in the production of both final goods
with goods market clearing. We start from the market clearing condition Qig = Yig
and the upper nest of the production function (1) to express relative demand for
the two goods as a function of the factors used in their production:
Qi1
Qi2
=
Yi1
Yi2
=
z1L
a
i1
1−β1Mi1β1
z2Lai2
1−β2Mi2β2
. (11)
Using the first order conditions in final goods production (C4), we can eliminate one
of the production factors from both the numerator and the denominator and replace
it by a function of the other factor and the relative factor price ratio. We do this
twice, first for the routine intermediates Mi1 and Mi2 and then for both abstract
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labor inputs:
Qi1
Qi2
=
[
wi
Pmi
]β1−β2 z1Lai1 [β1/(1− β1)]β1
z2Lai2 [β2/(1− β2)]β2
Qi1
Qi2
=
[
wi
Pmi
]β1−β2 z1Mi1 [(1− β1)/β1]1−β1
z2Mi2 [(1− β2)/β2]1−β2
.
We then equate both of these expressions to (10), the ratio of first order condi-
tions from the consumers’ problem, where the final goods prices have already been
replaced by the factor prices. The two resulting expressions determine the allocation
of abstract labor and the routine input to the two final goods sectors:
Lai1
Lai2
=
θ1(1− β1)
θ2(1− β2) ;
Mi1
Mi2
=
θ1β1
θ2β2
. (C9)
Given the Cobb-Douglas functional form assumptions on both the preferences and
technology, this allocation depends solely on preference and production function
parameters βg and θg.
Factor market clearing for abstract labor and the routine input across their use in
the two final good sectors implies Lai2 = L
a
i −Lai1 and Mi2 = Mi−Mi2. Substituting
in (C9) and rearranging, we find
Lai1 =
θ1(1− β1)∑
g θg(1− βg)
Lai ; Mi1 =
θ1β1∑
g θgβg
Mi. (C10)
Next, we take the ratio of the two factor demands (C10) for sector 1 and equate
it to the first order condition ratio (C4). After rearranging, we find the familiar
HO equation that connects relative factor abundance to relative factor prices. The
only difference in our model is that of interpretation: the factors on the LHS are
produced rather than exogenously given:
Lai
Mi
=
∑
g θg(1− βg)∑
g θgβg
Pmi
wi
(12)
We denote c =
∑
g θg(1−βg)∑
g θgβg
and replace the price of the routine input by its value in
(7) to find the relative factor demand in terms of the primitive factor prices
Lai
Mi
= c
[
wi
ri
Zα
σi
σi−1
]−1 [
1 +
(
wi
ri
)(
wi/(1− α)
ri/α
)−σi] 11−σi
. (C11)
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C.6 The equilibrium factor price ratio
The final step is to solve for the equilibrium factor price ratio by equating the relative
factor supply and demand. We have derived expressions for both equations in terms
of the primitive factor prices—(9) and (C11)—and in terms of the produced factor
prices—(C6) and (12). We equate the first two equations and find
(
wi
ri
)−1
c
[
1 +
(
wi
ri
)(
wi/(1− α)
ri/α
)−σi] 11−σi
=
[
L¯
K¯
−
(
wi/(1−α)
ri/α
)−σi]
[
1 +
(
wi
ri
)(
wi/(1−α)
ri/α
)−σi] σiσi−1 .
Rearranging and simplifying gives an implicit solution for the equilibrium factor
price ratio ω∗i = (wi/ri)
∗:
ω∗i = c
[
L¯
K¯
− (1 + c)
(
1− α
α
)σi
(ω∗i )
−σi
]−1
. (C12)
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Appendix D Comparative statics results
Given that the effective relative cost of labor is given by [wi/(1− αi)] / [ri/αi], we
can establish that, without normalization,
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∂(wi/ri)∗
∂σ
< 0, wi
ri
> 1−αi
αi
∂(wi/ri)∗
∂σ
= 0, wi
ri
= 1−αi
αi
∂(wi/ri)∗
∂σ
> 0, wi
ri
< 1−αi
αi
.
When labor is scarce and the equilibrium wage exceeds (1 − αi)/αi, labor will be
relatively cheap in the high-σ country. Note this refers to a ratio-of-ratios: the
relative real wage is lower in the high-σ country. Conversely, when labor is abundant
and cheap, it will be relatively expensive in the high-σ country.
A complication with these comparative statics results is that they hinge on the
effective cost of labor and αi is itself a function of σi. To break this circularity and
pin down the effect of σ on the equilibrium factor price ratio as a function of only
endowments and parameters, it is necessary to normalize the CES function.
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Appendix E Free trade equilibrium
E.1 Factor price equalization for produced factors
We focus on the case where both countries i = {A,B} produce both final goods
g = {1, 2}. As in the canonical HO model, trade then leads to the equalization of
the relative factor prices for the ‘produced’ factors that are the inputs for the two
final goods. To see this, we start from the fact that the ratios of both final goods’
prices equalize in the two countries, i.e.,
PA1
PA2
=
PB1
PB2
.
Given perfect competition in the final goods sectors, we already established that
prices equal production costs, i.e. that
Pig =
1
zgβ
βg
g (1− βg)1−βg
(Pmi )
βg(wi)1−βg . (8)
Substituting these expressions for the final good prices in the above ratios yields
(
PmA
wA
)β1−β2
=
(
PmB
wB
)β1−β2
, (E1)
and we see that the produced factor price ratios equalize in the two countries.
E.2 No factor price equalization for primitive factors
Importantly, however, opening up to trade does not lead to equalization of the factor
price ratios for the ‘primitive’ factors, capital and labor, that countries are endowed
with. This can be seen directly from equation (7) which reflects that price equals
marginal costs in the perfectly competitive routine sector, i.e.,
Pmi =
1
Z
[
ασir1−σii + (1− α)σi w1−σii
]− 1
1−σi . (7)
By factoring out w1−σii from both terms, we can rewrite the expression as
Pmi
wi
=
1
Z
[
ασi
(
ri
wi
)1−σi
+ (1− α)σi
]− 1
1−σi
. (E2)
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Equalization of the produced factor price ratio in (E1), makes it impossible for the
primitive factor price ratio on the right-hand side of equation (E2) to be the same
for two countries that differ in σi.
E.3 Trade reduces the wedge in the primitive factor price
ratio
We established that the relative price of the primitive factors is not equalized in the
free trade equilibrium. Now we show that the wedge becomes smaller under free
trade than in autarky.
We first express the relative price of the two final goods as a function of the ratio
of the two real wages ν = ωB/ωA. We start by substituting the price of the routine
intermediate (7) into the expression for the price of the final good (8) and take the
ratio of the two final good prices:
Pi1
Pi2
=
z2β
β2
2 (1− β2)1−β2Zβ2
z1β
β1
1 (1− β1)1−β1Zβ1
(
α
σi
σi−1
wi
ri
)β2−β1 [
1 +
(
wi
ri
)1−σi (1− α
α
)σi]β2−β1σi
.
We simplify the expression by grouping all country-invariant terms under a constant
B, replacing ωi = wi/ri, imposing the normalization α = 1/(1 + ω0), and bringing
the first ωi term into the square brackets:
Pi1
Pi2
= B(1 + ω0)
σi
σi−1 (β1−β2)
[
ωσi−1i + ω
σi
0
]β2−β1
σi .
Note that the derivative of this relative price ratio with respect to the relative wage
ωi is positive if good 1 is non-routine abundant (β1 < β2).
The relative final goods’ price ratio in the two countries is then
PA1/PA2
PB1/PB2
= (1 + ω0)
σA(1−σB)
σB(1−σA) (β2−β1)
[
ωσA−1A + ω
σA
0
]β2−β1
σA
[
ωσB−1B + ω
σB
0
]β1−β2
σB .
Using ωB/ωA = ν, we can write it as
PA1/PA2
PB1/PB2
=
⎧⎨
⎩(1 + ω0)
σA(1−σB)
σB(1−σA)
[
(ωB/ν)
σA−1 + ωσA0
] 1
σA[
ωσB−1B + ω
σB
0
] 1
σB
⎫⎬
⎭
β2−β1
. (E3)
This equation reflects how a difference in the relative prices for final goods between
the two countries is reflected in a wedge between their real wages. Given that the
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exponent on 1/ν is positive—because σi > 1 and β2 > β1—it implies that the
derivative of the RHS of expression (E3) is negative. This means that the relative
price of the non-routine intensive good in the high-σ country A is decreasing in ν.
In the case of capital deepening in autarky, we have established that both coun-
tries will reach a new equilibrium with ν > 1. To equate the relative final good price
ratio in both countries once they open up to trade, the price of the non-routine good
needs to rise relatively in the high-σ country A. To increase the relative price ratio
and equation (E3) still holding, ν must be reduced such that country A’s relative
real wage rises. We have already shown, however, that primitive factor prices do
not equalize entirely and ν > 1 remains true in the free trade equilibrium.
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Appendix F Additional results
F.1 First-stage point estimates for benchmark results
Table F.1: (Non-)Routine export specialization among EU member states
Coef. St.Dev. Coef. St.Dev. Coef. St.Dev.
FIN -0.158 (.016) -0.151 (.015) -0.127 (.013)
IRL -0.127 (.016) -0.128 (.015) -0.105 (.013)
SWE -0.131 - -0.104 - -0.079 -
GBR -0.087 (.016) -0.087 (.015) -0.070 (.013)
FRA -0.061 (.016) -0.048 (.015) -0.032 (.013)
DEU -0.058 (.016) -0.050 (.015) -0.031 (.013)
MLT -0.046 (.021) -0.021 (.017) -0.057 (.015)
NLD -0.039 (.016) -0.040 (.015) -0.026 (.013)
AUT -0.045 (.016) -0.028 (.015) -0.018 (.013)
SVK 0.027 (.017) -0.031 (.015) -0.053 (.014)
HUN 0.028 (.016) -0.026 (.015) -0.032 (.013)
CZE 0.020 (.016) -0.036 (.015) -0.015 (.013)
SVN 0.017 (.017) -0.003 (.015) -0.029 (.013)
BEL -0.013 (.016) -0.001 (.015) 0.026 (.013)
CYP 0.036 (.019) 0.007 (.016) -0.029 (.014)
GRC 0.040 (.017) 0.019 (.015) 0.018 (.013)
ESP -0.008 (.016) 0.036 (.015) 0.068 (.013)
POL 0.012 (.016) 0.044 (.015) 0.043 (.013)
DNK 0.026 (.016) 0.034 (.015) 0.044 (.013)
ITA 0.014 (.016) 0.043 (.015) 0.058 (.013)
HRV 0.021 (.018) 0.039 (.015) 0.063 (.014)
EST 0.080 (.018) 0.051 (.015) 0.021 (.014)
BGR 0.047 (.017) 0.064 (.015) 0.073 (.013)
LVA 0.085 (.019) 0.100 (.015) 0.038 (.014)
PRT 0.091 (.017) 0.085 (.015) 0.086 (.014)
LTU 0.112 (.018) 0.123 (.015) 0.077 (.013)
ROM 0.118 (.017) 0.109 (.015) 0.089 (.014)
No. of obs.
Note: Dependent variable is the log of bilateral exports at the industry level. Explanatory variables are the interactions 
between country dummies and the routineness indicator, normalized by the sample average (SWE is the excluded country). 
Control variables (not reported) are four interactions between country-endowments and industry-intensities, as well as 
destination-industry and origin-destination fixed effects. The indicator and dependent variable are standardized Z-variables 
such that the effects are measures in standard deviations. Countries are sorted by the average of the estimates over the four 
years.
1995 2005 2015
48,988 54,561 56,556
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Table F.2: (Non-)Routine export specialization in sample of 50 largest exporters
Coef. St.Dev. Coef. St.Dev. Coef. St.Dev.
JPN -0.205 (.012) -0.181 (.011) -0.172 (.010)
SGP -0.174 (.012) -0.163 (.011) -0.136 (.010)
FIN -0.144 (.012) -0.145 (.011) -0.122 (.010)
SWE -0.150 (.012) -0.132 (.011) -0.109 (.010)
ISR -0.120 (.013) -0.121 (.011) -0.123 (.010)
IRL -0.111 (.012) -0.118 (.011) -0.112 (.010)
MEX -0.085 (.013) -0.115 (.011) -0.114 (.010)
CHE -0.126 (.012) -0.096 (.011) -0.084 (.010)
USA -0.112 (.012) -0.086 (.011) -0.078 (.010)
TWN -0.070 (.012) -0.083 (.011) -0.091 (.010)
MYS -0.049 (.012) -0.062 (.011) -0.069 (.010)
FRA -0.083 (.012) -0.057 (.011) -0.038 (.010)
DEU -0.078 (.012) -0.062 (.011) -0.038 (.010)
GBR -0.082 (.012) -0.057 (.011) -0.033 (.010)
NOR -0.047 (.012) -0.059 (.011) -0.050 (.010)
RUS -0.044 (.013) -0.044 (.011) -0.061 (.010)
NLD -0.057 (.012) -0.049 (.011) -0.028 (.010)
CAN -0.058 (.012) -0.032 (.011) -0.023 (.010)
AUT -0.040 (.012) -0.025 (.011) -0.022 (.010)
SAU -0.036 (.014) -0.017 (.012) -0.031 (.011)
CHN -0.034 (.012) -0.023 (.011) -0.023 (.010)
BEL -0.043 (.012) -0.024 (.011) -0.010 (.010)
HUN 0.014 (.013) -0.048 (.011) -0.031 (.010)
KOR 0.019 (.012) -0.024 (.011) -0.032 (.010)
ARE -0.009 (.014) 0.010 (.011) -0.026 (.010)
ZAF 0.002 - 0.006 - 0.018 -
ESP -0.017 (.012) 0.016 (.011) 0.037 (.010)
SVN 0.034 (.014) 0.023 (.011) -0.006 (.010)
PHL 0.054 (.013) 0.011 (.011) -0.012 (.010)
CZE 0.080 (.013) -0.003 (.011) -0.004 (.010)
ITA 0.002 (.012) 0.031 (.011) 0.049 (.010)
DNK 0.014 (.012) 0.035 (.011) 0.049 (.010)
GRC 0.044 (.013) 0.036 (.011) 0.022 (.010)
POL 0.036 (.013) 0.043 (.011) 0.026 (.010)
SVK 0.059 (.014) 0.036 (.011) 0.017 (.010)
IDN 0.066 (.013) 0.035 (.011) 0.049 (.010)
BGR 0.039 (.014) 0.057 (.011) 0.054 (.010)
UKR 0.034 (.014) 0.058 (.011) 0.066 (.010)
IND 0.077 (.012) 0.049 (.011) 0.041 (.010)
PRT 0.069 (.013) 0.060 (.011) 0.051 (.010)
AUS 0.091 (.012) 0.067 (.011) 0.061 (.010)
BRA 0.065 (.012) 0.086 (.011) 0.086 (.010)
THA 0.101 (.012) 0.072 (.011) 0.075 (.010)
ROM 0.119 (.014) 0.111 (.011) 0.085 (.010)
TUR 0.122 (.013) 0.134 (.011) 0.111 (.010)
CHL 0.119 (.014) 0.156 (.012) 0.148 (.011)
NZL 0.159 (.013) 0.147 (.011) 0.140 (.010)
ARG 0.144 (.013) 0.156 (.011) 0.163 (.010)
VNM 0.236 (.016) 0.189 (.011) 0.113 (.010)
PER 0.179 (.016) 0.200 (.012) 0.209 (.011)
No. of obs.
1995 2005 2015
Note: Dependent variable is the log of bilateral exports at the industry level. Explanatory variables are the interactions 
between country dummies and the routineness indicator, normalized by the sample average (ZAF is the excluded country). 
Control variables (not reported) are four interactions between country-endowments and industry-intensities, as well as 
destination-industry and origin-destination fixed effects. The indicator and dependent variable are standardized Z-variables 
such that the effects are measures in standard deviations. Countries are sorted by the average of the estimates over years.
219,894 253,409 265,276
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F.2 First-stage estimates based on value added trade
Figure F.1: (Non-)Routine export specialization based on value added trade
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